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ABSTRACT

GENERATIONS APART: CULTURAL REVOLUTION MEMORY AND CHINA’S
POST-80’S GENERATION ON THE CHINESE INTERNET

June 2013

Vincent R. Capone, B.A., University of Massachusetts Amherst
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Professor Weili Ye

This thesis examines how the memory of the Cultural Revolution is used on the
Chinese internet by China’s post-80’s generation and the Chinese Communist Party to
describe and highlight examples of social instability. These comparisons are
representative of the broad historical narrative written by the Party which forms the basis
of how China’s younger generations learn about and internalize the Cultural Revolution.
This study analyzes how the memory of the Cultural Revolution is held by China’s post80’s generation as viewed through the lens of the Chinese Internet. Specifically, this
research engages with the intended purposes of the post-80’s generation for invoking
memories of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Internet. This revival and recharacterization of the Cultural Revolution’s social memory holds complex meanings for
how China’s post-1980’s generation defines the Cultural Revolution.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

After viewing a video that was shared throughout Chinese social media websites,
Chinese writer Li Chengpeng took to his blog to vent his frustrations. The video, which
has since been censored from the Chinese Internet, depicted an angry mob in Xi’an,
China engaged in smashing a Japanese-made Toyota Corolla.1 The car’s owner, a 51year-old Chinese man named Li Jianli, could be heard in the video pronouncing his
support over China’s claims to the island and his anti-Japanese stance. But that wasn’t
enough for one unidentified protester, who proceeded to take a U-shaped metal lock and
repeatedly beat the car owner’s head encircled by the crowd of onlookers. Li’s wife
rushed over to his slumped body to stop the blood pouring from his head while onlookers
took photos. The attack left the right side of Li Jianli’s body paralyzed.
Li Chengpeng used the social networking power of his blog to share the story and
seek justice for Li Jianli. His blog, which has over six million followers, makes Li one of
the most popular online personalities on Chinese social media. Li posted an image of the
man who beat Li Jianli, writing for readers to “remember this face; it is the guy

1

The smashing of Japanese cars was seen as an act of protest against Japan’s recent claims to a contested
island chain, known in Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands. Similar acts occurred throughout Chinese cities in
September 2012, accompanied by state-approved protests and boycotts or Japanese products and retailers.
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who…beat the Xi’an Japanese car owner Li Jianli.”2 Taking into account similar stories
which peppered Chinese news and the anti-Japanese fervor overtaking Chinese youth, Li
summarized that “the most frightening thing was not the violence, but the violence being
called natural and just. The Cultural Revolution was just like this.”3
Comparing recent violence against the memory of the Cultural Revolution is a
new trend on Chinese social media. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Cultural
Revolution), a social and political movement, took place in China between 1966 and
1976. Social upheaval and political factions during this period led to the Chinese
Communist Party (the Party) since branding the decade one of extreme turmoil. On the
Chinese Internet, an influx in the invocation of the Cultural Revolution by China’s post1980’s generation is used to call to denounce violent acts such as the car smashing.
Turning to Chinese social media, these youth compare current events to negative and
often violent aspects of the Cultural Revolution in order to highlight current ills of
Chinese society. In most instances, events are related back to the Cultural Revolution as a
means to deter society from returning to a period of social and political chaos.
The growth of the internet in China has granted Chinese citizens a new outlet for
having their voices heard. Chinese youth in particular log onto the web and speak out
against corruption, build movements such as the anti-Japanese car smashings, and rally
against environmental issues. Netizens, or internet users, are able to take advantage of
internet anonymity to raise issues that could never been raised offline due to poorly
defined anti-subversion laws often used to prosecute individuals exercising their right to
2

Li Chengpeng (李承鹏), Weibo.com Blog, September 26, 2012, Accessed September 27, 2012,
http://weibo.com/1189591617/yDE7hhg7k.
3
Li Chengpeng, Weibo.com Blog.
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assembly under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. 4 With over 500
million users accessing the Chinese internet, it has become a place of political
participation. More importantly, the internet has become a virtual community for China’s
post-80’s generation, as they account for nearly two-thirds of those who log online.
These communities of web forums and microblogs provide a window into the
social issues important to youth in China. In these locations, social memory of the
Cultural Revolution is both discussed and reflected upon, specifically to comment upon
the severity of current events and social issues in China. This study will analyze
discussion on the modern internet as a lens to show how China’s post-80’s generation
regards the history of the Cultural Revolution. A severe gap in historical knowledge is
present among this generation compounded by the Party’s obscuration of historical fact,
and after four decades memory of the Cultural Revolution is primarily used on Chinese
social media to describe violent behaviors to highlight areas of current instability in
Chinese society. The post-80’s generation uses its violent memory to progressively move
society forward, while concurrently using its memory as a label to denounce societal
violence. As netizens use the Cultural Revolution as a metaphor to describe areas of
social instability, the Party uses the invocation of Cultural Revolution memory to glaze
over the decade as a period of social turmoil that could repeat itself should China adopt a
multi-party system. This thesis will show that these uses of memory are a result of the
Party’s strict censorship of Cultural Revolution-relation publications and a purposely
broad writing of the state’s official history of the decade.

4

Derived from the term, “internet citizens.” A user who is active in the internet community. In Chinese, 网
民 (wangmin).

3

The methods used for this research will be unique in the sense that online
sourcing will play an integral part of this thesis’ primary research. Sources from the
internet will include opinion pieces by prominent Chinese bloggers, snippets of social
commentary from online editorial e-magazines, and a survey of viral posting on Chinese
social media. 5 These hot topics will include heavily shared images and messages, as well
as tweets and mentions of the Cultural Revolution in making connections or describing
current events on social media. Because of the fragility of internet sourcing, where a link
or image is present one day but can be deleted the next, it has become routine to printscreen all tweets and content and placing them into an archival database. All of the
sourcing will remain true to its original online web address, and a digital imaged copy of
the source will be preserved along with the research. 6
The social media primary sources which accompany this study will aim to
highlight the various ways that the Cultural Revolution remains an active topic among
Chinese netizens. This study will answer how the Cultural Revolution is being brought up
in social contexts on the internet by documenting netizen discussions. In posting about
the Cultural Revolution, social media users in China are providing a glimpse into how the
memory of that decade reverberates with China’s post-80’s generation, and how that
memory sets itself against the official Party narrative which is provided to youth through
educational indoctrination.
To gauge what well-respected and conspicuous voices are saying about the
Cultural Revolution on the internet, this study will document the writings and comments
5

Viral refers to something that becomes popular through the process of Internet sharing through social
media, instant messaging, and email.
6
References to internet web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. The author is not responsible
for URLs that may have expired or changed since publishing.
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of popular Chinese bloggers. These bloggers have a large following of readers on their
blogs and microblog accounts, giving worth to their voice as many of their opinions and
comments are shared across the Chinese social media sphere. The blog posts by these
prominent bloggers initiates a larger discussion in the comments section, which often
spawns its own set of opinions. Blogs and social media posts are an important aspect of
this research because of the social memory that is being called upon on the internet, and
how that is created against the backdrop of the official history as constructed by the Party.
Forerunning research on netizen youth seeks to examine the context of online
social movements and political activism such as the Human Flesh Search, an internet
phenomenon which will be discussed in detail in chapter three. This study endeavors to
anchor discussion on the Chinese Internet in a historical context, a discipline largely
disconnected from scholarship on internet studies. This work distinguishes how scholars
understand the Cultural Revolution in the modern era, and how the memory of this period
is kept alive and reconstructed by China’s post-80’s youth through the internet.
Furthermore this study adds historiographical conversation on the larger social and
cultural movements in China, and how the internet plays into the memory of social and
cultural movements as time passes.
The significance of this research is multi-faceted. Due in part to the Chinese
Internet’s homogeneous make-up, chatter on the Chinese web remains largely absent
from western media and Chinese netizens and their behavior remain largely unknown to
westerners. This research broadens scholarly understanding of not just Chinese history,
but how the internet can be used as an interdisciplinary approach to conducting historical
inquiry. Barriers such as language and censorship are two main factors for this

5

inaccessibility. Furthermore, many western media outlets lack the background knowledge
to place such events into a larger and often historical context, making experimentation on
the Chinese Internet and the internet distilling websites mentioned above very dangerous.
Therefore this research introduces events and their significance on the Chinese Internet to
a western audience, removing the invisible barrier that exists.
In order to place Chinese youth into the context of their actions on social media,
chapter two will profile China’s post-80’s generation, or those who were born after the
Cultural Revolution from 1980 onward. China’s post-80’s generation is unique in their
command of the Internet and in this study China’s post-80’s generation will be set against
the backdrop of the Internet and how they utilize the web to disseminate the social history
of the Cultural Revolution. These generations of youth in China have also fallen
susceptible to the Party’s broad narrative of defining the events of the Cultural
Revolution. Academics in China are concerned that this generation refuses to contradict
the official Party line when it comes to recounting Chinese history. In chapter two, this
study will anchor the online comments pertaining to the Cultural Revolution with the
state’s efforts to portray the Cultural Revolution in a broad history to Chinese youth,
particularly through watered down educational standards shaping the way these
generations speak about the Cultural Revolution.
In chapter three the demographics of the Chinese Internet will be examined. In
order to lay the context for this Cultural Revolution revival on the Chinese Internet, it is
necessary to set the scene of who primarily uses the Chinese Internet and for what
purposes. As this study will show, Communist Party officials “attach great importance to
social conditions and public opinion as reflected on the [Chinese] Internet, which has

6

become a bridge facilitating direct communication between the government and the
public.”7 The Party uses the internet to gauge social sentiment as well as a means to
supervise both the people and Party cadres, and the internet is merely a technological
evolution in a broad history of state-controlled monitoring
Chapter four will analyze recent recollections and invocations of the Cultural
Revolution through Chinese current events, Party warnings, and netizen reflections. The
post-80’s generation on the internet, drawing from the state’s history prescribed to them,
speak about the Cultural Revolution in terms of the Party’s narrative of the chaos and
turmoil and fail to comprehend the personal driving factors at work behind the Party’s
broad narrative. Netizens are subscribing to the Party’s constructed history of the Cultural
Revolution at the expense of the personal narratives of those who lived through it.
Blogger Li Chengpeng took to the internet to share the upsetting story of Li Jianli
and used his influence on cyberspace to get his followers to discuss the memory of the
Cultural Revolution. Li was born in 1968 during the early years of the Cultural
Revolution. Growing up in the 1970s, Li would not have experienced the unrestrained
destruction and violence dealt by the Red Guards. Yet this has not stopped him from
commenting on the violence of the car smashing in September 2012, making the
statement “the Cultural Revolution was just like this.” Li’s followers on his blog are
younger than he, born to the post-80’s generation. Lacking their own personal memories,
it is very likely that their knowledge of the period is heavily influenced by the Party’s
history and the standards taught to them in school. But that doesn’t stop them from

7

Guobin Yang, “Technology and Its Contents: Issues in the Study of the Chinese Internet,” The Journal of
Asian Studies 70 (2011): 1043-1050.
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drawing connections between such violence as the anti-Japanese car smashings and that
of the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution.

8

CHAPTER 2
CHINA’S POST-80’S GENERATION AND THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE

The Cultural Revolution is often depicted as a negative political movement of
mass hysteria that led to a tremendous loss of culture, ideals, and life. The movement saw
Mao Zedong, founding father of the People’s Republic of China and governing Chairman
of the Communist Party of China, elevated to god-like status. However, leading Chinese
modern historian Jonathan Spence argues that the Cultural Revolution defies simple
classification. Instead various forces fed into one another to create a paralyzing political
climate.
In this chapter, the history of the Cultural Revolution will be provided to lay the
foundation for this study. Within this historical lens, the framework for the officially
constructed history of the Cultural Revolution by the Party under Deng Xiaoping will be
analyzed to show that in the early 1980’s, Party leaders sought to distance themselves
from the failed politics of Mao. What will be brought to light is a gap existing between
the official history of the Party and that retold through personal memoirs and literature. .
China’s post-80’s generation will be profiled against the backdrop of this ideology shift
at the turn of the decade. Further analysis will be given to how the Party stifled research
and scholarship on the subject also beginning in the post-Cultural Revolution period.

9

Finally, this study will show how the history of the Cultural Revolution is taught among
China’s post-1980s generation, and how that history prescribes to the Party’s line.

2.1 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution is often depicted as a negative political movement of
mass hysteria that led to a tremendous loss of culture, ideals, and life. The movement saw
Mao Zedong, founding father of the People’s Republic of China and governing Chairman
of the Communist Party of China, elevated to god-like status. However, leading Chinese
modern historian Jonathan Spence argues that the Cultural Revolution defies simple
classification. Instead various forces fed into one another to create a paralyzing political
climate.
Twentieth-century China is defined as having a tense political climate. After
overthrowing the Manchu-ruled Qing Imperial Dynasty in 1911, Nationalists under Dr.
Sun Yat-sen established the Republic of China. 8 As the Nationalists struggled to rid
China of warlord factions and a growing Japanese presence on the mainland, varying
political forces established themselves, of which the Party came into existence. 9 Chinese
Communists fought to reshape China through a system characterized by state ownership
over the economy. Since the inception of the Communist Party of China, the Communists
struggled for legitimacy as the government of China against the Nationalists, ultimately
8

The Kuomintang, or the Chinese Nationalist Party, was one of the dominant political parties on the
Chinese mainland. The party remains one of the main political factors of the Republic of China, Taiwan.
9
The Party was officially established after the First Party Congress on July 1, 1921. Chinese Communism
is based itself off Marxism-Leninism, a Communist ideology following the theories of Karl Marx and
Vladimir Lenin. Such ideology includes socialism, or a system characterized by state ownership over the
economy.
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driving them out and founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.10
Under the leadership of Chairman Mao, the People’s Republic remained heavily guarded
from the western world. Mao and the Communists quickly implemented Communist land
reform, moving from a landlord ownership system to a distribution system.
Mao’s socialist ideology soon began to deter from its Marxist-Leninist roots to
become later known as Maoism, or Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong Thought differed
from its origin due to its agrarian focus and the emphasis of power which Mao placed
upon the peasant class.11 Mao Zedong Thought heavily influenced Communist policies
from 1950-1976. The Great Leap Forward (1957-1960) was a disastrous economic plan
that caused the largest famine in Chinese history. 12 As a result of its failure, Mao’s
influence began to wane. As Party cadres begin to overshadow the Chairman, Mao
sought a means to reenter the spotlight, which resulted in the Cultural Revolution.
The Cultural Revolution saw Mao reach the apex of his political power in China.
For the Cultural Revolution, Mao sought a political campaign that would strengthen
socialism throughout China and continue his ideology of constant class conflict, or the

10

Prior to World War II, the Nationalists who possessed a larger and better trained force than the
Communists. After small-scale campaigns, the two dominant political parties halted the civil war to turn
their attention to the invading Japanese who had established a stronghold in Manchuria. After the Japanese
surrendered, the Nationalists and Communists engaged in a full-scale civil war. The Nationalists, weakened
from the war with Japan and the successful spread of Communist ideology among peasants, faced defeat on
the mainland, retreating to the island of Taiwan.
11
This emphasis was placed upon the peasantry in response to China’s large agrarian culture and smallscale urban workforce. Maoism was abandoned following the Cultural Revolution due to its counterproductivity to economic growth and the social order, best exemplified through two political movements
spearheaded by Mao: the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
12
During this period, China underwent widespread collectivization in rural areas. In order to increase steel
production, Mao urged peasants to melt down their metal and iron wares. Men were moved from farming to
smelt down pots, pans, and agricultural equipment. What resulted was the production of pig iron, of little
economic worth, at the expense of tending to agriculture, causing widespread famine. Like the Cultural
Revolution, writer Murong Xuecun notes that “research about the famine cannot be published, schools do
not teach it, newspapers may not carry any reports about it and archives covering it remain closed to the
public.” Frank Dikotter’s book, Mao’s Great Famine estimates at least 45 million deaths.
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struggles between classes for equality in society. Mao argued that the socialist revolution
was losing impetus due to a lumbering bureaucracy and Party conservatism, declaring
bureaucrats of “taking the capitalist road” and diverging from the socialist path dependent
on the peasantry. This mixed with the personal ambitions of various Party leaders, such
as Vice Premier Lin Biao who wanted to increase the role of the army into politics, and
those who opposed Mao’s policies, such as Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi. 13
In the summer of 1966, the political factionalism reached a climax. On August 8,
the Central Committee of the Party passed the “Decision Concerning the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (also known as the Sixteen Points). This defined the
movement as “a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a
new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a stage which is
both broader and deeper.”14 With its passing, Mao sought to eradicate bourgeois elements
within society through the establishment of a people’s dictatorship and the elimination of
the Four Olds. The Four Olds, referencing old customs, old habits, old culture, old
thinking, were things defined as anti-proletariat “fostered by the exploiting classes”
which “poisoned the minds of the people for thousands of years.” 15 Mao urged the
masses to destroy the Four Olds and replace them with new habits and thinking in order
to move China further from its traditional roots and into a new era. As a result, Chinese
Red Guards destroyed works of classical Chinese literature, cultural relics, and
desecrated Chinese temples and personal homes.

13

Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, (Norton, 1990), 603.
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, “Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution,” August 8, 1966.
15
Li Gucheng, A Glossary of Political Terms of The People's Republic of China, (Chinese University
Press), 427.
14
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Red Guard factions led the campaign to destroy the Four Olds throughout China
primarily during 1966-1967. Red Guards, a military-like force made up of Chinese youth,
heeded Mao’s ideology as exemplified by their use of carrying around and quoting from
Quotations from Chairman Mao.16 This saw the promotion of Mao to a god-like status,
specifically among youth. During this period, schools and universities shut down and Red
Guards were left unaccountable due to their paramilitary status. Left to imply their own
terms to the campaign based off Mao’s ideology, Red Guards became eager to prove their
revolutionary zeal and attacked any who tried to stunt their influence. As such, Red
Guards targeted intellectuals as holding “reactionary” modes of thinking, with many
enduring humiliating experiences of being paraded through the streets and forced to wear
dunce caps in front of large crowds.17 Violence soon grew exponentially, with
intellectuals and those with a class status listed as one of the “seven categories of black
elements” being beaten to death.18 Youth turned against their neighbors, teachers, Party
cadres, and in some cases, their own relatives. Red Guard factions competed for power in
local neighborhoods, striving to prove who best exemplified Mao Zedong Thought.
In his memoir, Gang of One: Memoirs of a Red Guard, author Fan Shen tells of
his experiences throughout the decade. Shen actively became a Red Guard and felt pride
in his role until he participated in the ransacking and torture of a local family. Shen

16

The book, Quotations from Chairman Mao, better known in the west as the “Little Red Book,” is an
anthology of selected statements, speeches, and writings of Chairman Mao. Copies of the book were
heavily distributed in the early years of the Cultural Revolution, and carried by Red Guards throughout
Chinese cities. Quotations from Chairman Mao is also prominent in propaganda posters and images from
the early 1960s.
17
Spence, The Search for Modern China, 606.
18
The “seven categories of black elements” were landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad
elements, rightists, capitalist roaders, and reactionary academic authorities. Anyone falling into this
category, or with ancestors or relatives who fell into the category, were persecuted.
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recalls his experience reading wall posters, in which Red Guards, confused with whom
they should be targeting, turned on competing factions:
At first, most posters were serious debates among various Red Guard
‘fighting teams,’ … but they could not agree on who were the great
enemies that the Great Leader wanted them to expose. Oddly they seemed
to find the hidden enemies in other Red Guard teams, and they seemed to
hate each other so much that they called each other ‘guards of capitalist
dogs’ and wanted to chop their opponents with ‘ten thousand knives.’ In
those days, nobody saw the ridiculousness of the fight among Red Guard
factions.19

His account of Red Guard competition in his neighborhood speaks to the chaos of the
early years of the Cultural Revolution. Years later in the early 1970s, Shen recalls the
personal afflictions those who were denounced or struggled against faced. While working
at the East Wind Aircraft Factory, Shen’s co-worker was arrested on charges of child
corruption for allegedly teaching several teenagers “bourgeois” songs. After being
arrested his co-worker, nicknamed “Singer,” was dragged to a stage in front of the entire
factory workforce and denounced. Shen recalls the experience, writing, “Looking at my
friend’s face, I could see the fear he must be experiencing: the fear of total loneliness, of
being completely forsaken, of being condemned by everyone he knew, spit upon and
shunned by the entire society.” 20 As will be shown in chapter two, such experiences,
crucial to the public memory of the Cultural Revolution, remain absent from the official
narrative.
The power of the Red Guards began to wane in 1968. In December of that year,
Mao began the Down to the Countryside Movement which lasted for the next decade.

19
20

Fan Shen, Gang of One, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 11-12.
Ibid, 156.
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The Movement sent youth from urban cities into rural farming and mountain villages to
learn from the workers and peasants, and to combat urban bourgeois thinking. Youth
during this time forewent formal education and many lost their chance at higher
education as a result of moving into China’s rural areas, causing many to refer to this
generation as the “lost generation.” Known as the “sent-down youth” of China, many
remained in rural areas until after Mao’s death in 1976.21
China’s isolation from the western world during the Mao years marked extreme
tension between China and western nations due to China’s communist influence over the
Southeast Asian region. Due to its isolation, few westerners experienced China during the
tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution. Knowledge of this period in the west is
heavily influenced by literary memoirs produced by the generation who came of age
during the Cultural Revolution. While Cultural Revolution memory flourishes in western
contexts, through these memoirs and university seminars, few non-scholars are aware of
the absence of Cultural Revolution memory within China, and the implications this holds
for its post-80’s youth. This study becomes extremely poignant to showcase the
implications of Cultural Revolution revivalism on the internet, and how China’s post-80’s
generation subscribes to the Party’s official narrative. As such, it is important that the
legacy and social memory of the Cultural Revolution be studied and shared among
western scholarly audiences.
In the book, Growing Up in the People’s Republic of China, authors Ye Weili and
Ma Xiaodong reflect upon their experiences growing up during the Cultural Revolution.

21

Sent down youth in Chinese, 知识青年 (zhishi qingnian), meaning “educated youth,” commonly referred
to as “zhiqing.”
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Set as a conversation between the two women, Ye argues that the experiences
encountered during the Cultural Revolution created her generation. Youth during the
period “entered adulthood, an especially impressionable stage in people’s lives, at
precisely the time when political and social order was turned upside down,” and this
generation underwent some of the most severe trials and tribulations. 22 Violence was
pervasive during the early years of the Cultural Revolution, and many youth acting as
Red Guards committed or witnessed extreme acts of torture. As a result, the Cultural
Revolution has become a highly sensitive topic in China, and a great silence falls over the
actions of former Red Guards. This works to create the Cultural Revolution as a taboo
topic of discussion in China, allowing the Party to hold up its own narration of events
which this study will prove has led to current youth using its memory to call to attention
social turmoil.
As a scholar of history, Ye admits to being troubled by the sweeping historical
negation of the Cultural Revolution by the Party in the decades since, arguing that such
actions are working to “bleach memories of our parents, and even us.” 23 Ye fears that the
personal experiences of the Cultural Revolution generation are beginning to disappear in
the public’s memory. Chinese youth, she argues, “see their country’s history beginning
with the launching of the economic reform in the late 1970s; everything prior is
prehistory and makes little sense. Sadly, a country known for its thousands of years of
continuous history now is suffering from a broken sense of history.”24 Negation of the
Cultural Revolution is perceived as a wrong turn in the Party’s path. In essence this has
22

Ye Weili and Ma Xiaodong, Growing Up in the People’s Republic, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2005), 2.
23
Ibid, 7.
24
Ibid, 7.
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worked to create a historic roadblock at the end of the Cultural Revolution; a road block
which says to youth that all that came before were merely bumps along the way to the
prosperous reform period from the 1980s onward. As such, the Party effectively created a
sense among youth that any social acts resembling the Cultural Revolution will deter
prosperity and endanger society.
The memory of the Cultural Revolution cannot be simply placed into categories
such as personal memory, social memory, or official history. Many social and cultural
factors shape the memories of this decade, and as this study will show, the memories of
the Cultural Revolution have begun to take on different meanings to different generations.
The memory of those who lived during the Cultural Revolution is kept alive through
memoirs written by those who came of age from 1966-1976. These memoirs, while
prevalent in the west, are more often than not banned in China. As a result, these personal
histories of the Cultural Revolution remain absent from the state history, which was
officially drawn up in 1981 after the end of the Cultural Revolution.

2.2 “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party”

As China began a slow recovery from the failed politics of Mao during the
Cultural Revolution, the Party’s new leaders needed a means to reassure the people of
their right to rule. Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and de facto
leader of China from 1977 until his retirement from politics in 1992, sought to bring
order out of chaos. As such, the Party wrote an official state narrative of the events of the
Cultural Revolution, reestablishing the Party’s proud history against the social bumps

17

caused by the Cultural Revolution. In totalitarian regimes the world over, history has
been a tool aiding ruling powers in obtaining legitimacy, and the ruling parties within
these states have “ceaselessly sought to dominate and manipulate public and private
memory.”25 The role of history takes on a similar role in the People’s Republic of China.
Mao and his cadres worked to control the messages imparted in history; to bend those
messages in favor of official policy lines. The Communists sough to “extirpate any
manifestation of dissent or opposition that might be hidden in historical allegory…the
historians, in short, were to serve as handmaidens to the Party propagandists.”26 It is
important to understand how the Party represents the Cultural Revolution in its official
narrative, and how that narrative has been presented to the people and shaped the social
memory among succeeding generations.
After the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, the Party sought to move
forward and distance itself from the events of 1966-1976, and the revolutionary fervor
created by Mao and lasting until his death in 1976. In order to preserve the Party’s
legitimacy after a period seen as chaos, a narrative of the decade was drawn up to clarify
the Cultural Revolution’s role within Party history. The result was the 1981 “Resolution
on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s
Republic of China.” Drafted under the guidance of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee and of its Secretariat, Marxist philosopher and prior Vice President of the
Party’s Propaganda Department Hu Qiaomu served as the principal leader of the
Resolution’s drafting board. Deng Xiaoping and Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang
25
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presided over the entirety of the work, giving their opinions and input. The Resolution
was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981. Its adoption marked an important shift from
the end of the Mao era to the beginning of the reform era under Deng Xiaoping.
The Resolution went through numerous drafts and Party members spent over a
year revising and discussing the document 27. As the Chinese people began to pick up the
pieces and reassess their lives after the end of the Cultural Revolution, they began to
wonder how the state would move address the past decade as it preceded to move
forward. Deng began to stress for urgency in producing a final product, highlighting the
fact that the document was eagerly being awaited by individuals both domestically and
abroad. Speaking with his drafting group on April 7, 1981, Deng urged the document’s
completion:
Some comrades have said that perhaps we shouldn't be in such a rush to
write this resolution. But that's wrong because people are waiting for it. In
China, people both inside and outside the Party are waiting. If we don't
come out with something, there can be no unity of views on major issues.
The world is waiting, too. People are watching events in China with some
doubts about its stability and unity. And one of their doubts is about
whether we can produce this document, and if so, when. So we can't take
any longer because further delay will be unfavorable.28

Deng made known the necessity for the Committee to produce a united explanation of
“major issues,” including the Cultural Revolution in order to placate outside sources
doubting the stability and unity of the Party. As a result, in his remarks on successive
drafts of the Resolution leading up to June 1981, Deng Xiaoping stresses the need for the
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section devoted to the Cultural Revolution to be “written in broad outline.” 29 This was to
be the first time that the Cultural Revolution was to be officially discussed and negated
by the Communist Party, and Deng sought succinct writing to present a clear official
narrative. Previous drafts which were presented to him were found to be “overextended.”30
In the Resolution’s final release, the Cultural Revolution was denounced as a state
disaster that lasted from 1966 to 1976. However, due to Deng’s requirements of brevity,
specific details of how the period affected average citizens remained absent. These
personal details continue to remain absent from the Party’s history and shape how
China’s post-80’s generation learn about and perceive the Cultural Revolution. The
Resolution effectively places a label on the Cultural Revolution, denouncing it as a
mistake and running loose from socialist policy and “Chinese reality,” an effort on the
Party’s behalf to place blame on the failures of the decade. The Resolution reads that
“history has shown that the ‘cultural revolution,’ initiated by a leader laboring under a
misapprehension and capitalized on by counter-revolutionary cliques, led to domestic
turmoil and brought catastrophe to the Party, the state and the whole people.”31
In order to protect the socialist ideology granting legitimization to the ruling
Communist government, the Resolution makes sure to note that “the history of the
‘cultural revolution’ has proved that Comrade Mao Zedong’s principal theses for
initiating this revolution conformed neither to Marxism, Leninism nor to Chinese
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reality.”32 In this line, the government ensures that the disaster of the Cultural Revolution
does not leave too deep a scar upon the face of China’s sole-ruling Party and the ideology
it founded itself on. While the bulk of the Resolution seeks to place the blame on Mao’s
“gross mistakes,” the document cautions that “if we judge his activities as a whole, his
contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his mistakes,” ensuring that Mao’s
legacy as a hero of the Communist Party remained intact. 33
With the blame planted on Mao but insuring that his legacy to the Party remained
intact, the Party used the resolution to call to memory the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution ensuring that “the kind of chaotic situation that obtained in the ‘cultural
revolution’ must never be allowed to happen again in any sphere.”34 The document goes
on to note that revolutionary zeal behind that decade did not constitute as progress:
Practice has shown that the ‘cultural revolution’ did not in fact constitute a
revolution or social progress in any sense, nor could it possibly have done
so. It was we and not the enemy at all who were thrown into disorder by
the ‘cultural revolution.’ Therefore, from beginning to end, it did not turn
‘great disorder under heaven’ into ‘great order under heaven,’ nor could it
conceivably have done so.35

With this statement, the Resolution negates the very purpose of the Cultural Revolution,
insinuating that the very foundations of the movement, such as the campaign to destroy
the Four Olds, granting power to Red Guard factions, and promoting constant class
struggle, had no purpose being instated. Throughout the resolution the Party places labels
on the Cultural Revolution such as ‘disorder,’ ‘chaos,’ and ‘mistake,’ shaping the legacy
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of this decade in the Party’s official history. However this paragraph alone explicitly
repudiates the purposes of the Cultural Revolution.
Within the document the Cultural Revolution is broken down into three distinct
political periods: the release of the May 16 Notification by Mao in 1966 to the Ninth
Party Congress in April 1969, the Ninth Party Congress to the Tenth Party Congress of
the Communist Party in August 1973, and the Tenth Party Congress to the arrest of the
Gang of Four in October 1976.36 Throughout these three periods, the blame is placed
upon failed political actions and overarching struggles between national Party leaders led
primarily by “Comrade Mao.” Mao’s allegations attributing capitalist-roaders of being
within the Party, a driving force of Mao Zedong Thought, “plunged the nation into
turmoil.”37 What remains absent from this state-approved history is any mention of the
people’s actions throughout China, the struggles they faced, and the turmoil caused at the
local level.
While calling out the Cultural Revolution as a political disaster, Deng knew he
could not openly negate it, for this would trivialize the actions of Mao who was seen as
the standard bearer of Marxism-Leninism to China and played a crucial role in the
founding of the People’s Republic. Instead the Resolution was carefully crafted to
highlight the mistakes made by Mao in his later years, while upholding his earlier
contributions to the Party. These mistakes, the Resolution explains, were able to be
righted through reform, further legitimizing the Party’s rule. Deng himself had an
important role to play in moving the nation away from the Cultural Revolution. Like
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many intellectuals, Deng was purged and placed under house arrest while Mao led a
nation-wide campaign to criticize Deng and his right-leaning stance. For Deng to be
rehabilitated and seeking a clarification of the decade’s history created a partnership
among intellectuals and citizens who suffered at the hands of their peers.
Finally, the Resolution marked the end of the policies of constant class struggle
characterized by Mao Zedong Thought, bringing in a new period of reform brought about
by the leadership of Deng. By placing the blame upon political figures rather than the
Party itself, the Communists were able to walk away from the newly revised history
revitalized and unscathed. What had been a dangerous obstacle instead watered down the
Cultural Revolution as being a relatively short period of turmoil set against an otherwise
glorious and revolutionary history of the People’s Republic. As such, the Resolution has
become symbolic of this shift from the Mao period to the era of reform; a shift that the
post-80’s generation believes divides Chinese society. It remains as a Party-built wall
hailing the topic as closed for reflection and future discussion, affecting the Cultural
Revolution’s memory among China’s post-80’s generation.

2.3 China’s Post-80’s Generation

The decade following the Cultural Revolution saw immense reform and economic
growth, at the hands of moving in the opposite direction from the newly re-written
history of the Party. As Chinese society grew out of the ashes, children born into China’s
post-Cultural Revolution generations have been greatly shaped by the nation’s opening
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up, sweeping economic reforms, and the technological advances of the internet, setting
themselves apart from the generations which came before.
Chinese born from 1980-1989, known in China as the “balinghou” were the first
generation born under the one-child policy, which was implemented in 1979. The onechild policy aimed to alleviate social and economic stress upon Chinese society due to
Mao’s belief that population growth granted power to the nation. 38 Scholars have argued
that the primarily single-child families in urban China mean that “China’s younger
generation, in its search for identity and belonging, is compelled to reach out to its peer
members outside of the family more so than any other earlier generations.”39 While
‘balinghou’ initially referred to those born within the period of 1980-1989, it has come to
represent all young people born after 1980, also known collectively as the reform-era
generation.40 For the purposes of this study, the term ‘youth’ will be defined as anyone
born from 1980-2000, currently averaging in age between fifteen and thirty. These
generations grew up in the internet age and with the Cultural Revolution firmly placed
within the Party’s history.
Older generations of Chinese, parents, educators, and Party leaders, have shared
concern over the raising of the post-80’s generation. Members of this group have been
criticized by these groups as being westernized, online gaming addicts, self-centered,
dependent, and spoiled.41 Most of these stereotypes are a result of the one-child policy
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which places each child under the watchful eyes of a set of parents and two sets of
grandparents, and also sees these family figures placing high expectations onto the child.
In Urban Youth in China: Modernity, the Internet and Self, author Liu Fengshui
explores the collective identity work behind www.80end.com, a website specifically built
for China’s eighties generation. Founded in 2006, the website has a daily average
publication rate of over one thousand new message threads. 42 The website’s mission is to
actively combat the stereotypes revolving around the post-80’s generation, by celebrating
the contributions of those within the generation to Chinese society, as well as providing
mutual enjoyment and communication. In short, the website aims to create a living online
museum of the post-80’s experience. Through his research online, Liu found that the
post-80’s generation works hard to set itself apart from all others, working against the
stereotypes which Chinese society has placed upon it.
Liu’s research on 80end.com uncovered a feeling of resentment coming forth
from those born between 1980-1989. Faced with new opportunities and wealth, Liu
commented that those on the website felt frustration and a feeling of being lost. Seeing
themselves as the “sacrificed generation,” many on the website felt they served as
unwitting social experiments in China’s modernization: the first to grow up in the market
economy, the first to fall under the one-child policy, and the first to shoulder the burden
of filial duty, or the duty of a child to care for his parents. 43 However this sentiment is at
odds with those felt by those who grew up during the Cultural Revolution, whose teenage
years were truly lost, spent performing manual labor in China’s rural areas.
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The parents of China’s post-80’s generation, born between 1950 and 1965, grew
up during the Cultural Revolution, into a world that was completely different from the
China of the reform era. Many who came of age during the Cultural Revolution decade
left education behind to embrace the revolutionary fervor transforming China. Youth
during this time spent their teenage years away from their family performing grueling
work alongside China’s workers and peasants. They were raised to believe in Maoism
and hold true the revolutionary spirit. But then they emerged from the 1970s into the
reform era of the 1980s, which brought a storm of social change and an identity crisis for
a whole generation.
Suddenly these young adults who had been shaped by Maoism and the constant
revolution were told that everything the Party had drilled into them had been a mistake,
compounded with such events as the passing of the Resolution of 1981. The
revolutionary activities of their youth were negated. Values deemed as ‘counterrevolutionary’ were hoisted back into society. As a result of having their youthful
experiences dictated to them, as well as facing extreme political and educational
competition after leaving the countryside, this generation who came of age during the
Cultural Revolution has been known to refer to themselves as the “lost generation,” a
term which is also used among those born in the 1980s, as shown by Liu’s experiences on
80end.com.
For the website’s second birthday, 80end.com posted a message declaring that
“the balinghou have turned from a group of children full of willfulness into the central
force in Chinese society that is willing to shoulder the responsibilities of social and
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national development.”44 And one means for this generation to move into this role is
through the internet. The internet provides a means for Chinese youth to have their voices
heard against their “junior status in a society characterized by a patriarchal power
hierarchy.”45 The post-80’s generation in China has embraced the internet, making up the
largest demographic of Chinese netizens.
One prominent Chinese blogger has been referred to as the unofficial voice of his
generation. Born in 1982, Han Han has gathered over eleven million followers on his
Sina Weibo microblogging account and published five books. In 2009 Time Magazine
named Han Han among the most influential in the world. His popularity is attributed to
his provocative writing reflecting the anxieties of China’s post-80’s generation. And Han
Han’s educational background defies the traditional expectations, as he dropped out of
high school and met and was later met with success.
Han Han’s most recent book, This Generation: Dispatches from China’s Most
Popular Literary Star (and Race Car Driver), is a collection of his work and blog entries
on varying topics spanning from 2006. In this book, Han Han establishes his credence as
the unofficial voice of his generation, granting explanations to negative labels placed
upon China’s post-80’s generation. Han Han writes that society at large labels his
generation as being self-oriented and apolitical. He comments that being self-oriented is
“actually not a bad thing” and that it is a direct consequence of the one-child policy. 46
Throughout his negation of labels placed upon his generation, Han Han places blame for
the supposed stereotypes on policies and actions instituted by China’s previous
44
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generations. These policies, such as the one-child policy, have affected the attitude and
experiences of his generation, at the expense of their control.
Speaking to his generation’s label of not caring about politics, Han Han writes
that belief off as a “ridiculous argument:”
In the current environment, politics isn’t something one can afford to care
about. Those people in the past, they simply found themselves cared about
by politics whether they liked it or not, and the roles they played were just
that of small fry, hapless victims swept around in the political currents of
the day. Being a victim is no decent topic of conversation, any more than
being raped has a place in a proper range of sexual experiences. The era
where one can care about politics has yet to arrive.47

Within this context, Han Han belittles generations which came before him as having been
puppets of Party politics. His comment of prior generations swept up in the political
currents of the day, descriptive of the Mao years, represents his view, and that of his
generation’s, that older Chinese were complacent and lacking any control in the political
realm. Han Han ends his statement with the comment that “the era where one can care
about politics has yet to arrive,” signifying that Communist rule in China, with its history
of victimizing its people, is not everlasting.
Han Han continues his attack on previous generations in China, “happily noting”
that his generation has significantly improved standards of conduct, such as not littering,
spitting, or cutting in line. These positive habits, he continues, were “gradually
established by those born after the Cultural Revolution. It’s our elders’ glorious tradition
that we have to thank for those vices and anti-social behaviors.”48 His tone and word
choice throughout this and the following paragraph portrays a clear contempt for those
47
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who came before him. And as the unofficial voice of his generation, clearly emblemized
by his book’s title, it is assumed that his sentiments represents that of China’s post-80’s
generation.
Since Han Han’s rise to popularity on the Chinese Internet, he has met with fierce
criticism from China’s established literary world, and as a result he was involved in
several controversies over the legitimacy of his writing. Some of his blog posts have also
fallen under government censorship, permanently removed from cyberspace. All of these
setbacks have been described as a remnant of the Cultural Revolution by Han Han,
further commenting that “there’s no tradition for debate. People think if your position is
different, they should try to destroy you.”49 In his work, Han Han successfully drives a
wedge between his generation and those which came prior, reiterating the generational
wall that formed in Chinese society marked by the end of the Cultural Revolution.
Another defining quality of the post-80’s generation is their strong sense of
nationalism. Instances of inflamed nationalism among Chinese youth in recent years
include efforts to boycott French designer products after protests marred the French leg
of the 2008 Olympic torch relay, the creation of an anti-CNN website after an American
cable news anchor called Chinese officials “a bunch of goons and thugs,” and vigorous
stances against Tibetan autonomy. This nationalism is distinct from the Communist Party
in China, as Liu discerned based off one netizen’s post at 80end.com: “Loving the
country and loving the Party are two different things. I’d like to give one illustration. The
country is over 5,000 years old now. However, the current government is only several
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decades old.”50 While nationalist sentiments are found throughout Chinese society,
inflamed beliefs on the autonomy of Chinese territories and defending China’s image
against western audiences are two instances of nationalism heavily characterized by the
online commentaries of Chinese youth.
Speaking of America in his book National Trauma and Collective Memory:
Extraordinary Events in the American Experience, Arthur G. Neal writes that the most
recent generations are “notorious in their disregard for the long reach of their historical
past…There is a sense of comfort in putting bad times behind us and thinking positively
about both the present and the future.”51 The same can be attributed to the current
generation of youth living in China. Such examples will arise in chapter four in which
case netizens have taken it upon themselves to call for the arrests of all who committed
wrongful acts during the period.
Neal explains why it is important for younger generations to remember a
traumatic history, even though they have not experienced it. He says, “When a trauma
becomes national in scope, however, both the needs of individuals and the needs of the
social system must be addressed. At the level of the social system, there is a need to give
some form of enduring recognition to traumatic events.”52 However, as will become
apparent, the needs of the Cultural Revolution generation are not presented in the state’s
official narrative. In fact, the trauma of the people is completely absent from that
narrative. And due to state restrictions on scholarship attributed to the period, the
messages of the Cultural Revolution generation are not being passed on. These messages
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are important, as they help the nation minimize such problems in the future while
preparing future generations for the challenges ahead. However, one must question how
equipped China’s post-80’s generation is for the challenges as long as the history
presented by the Party is incomplete and one-sided.

2.4 Cultural Revolution Literature

The Party’s historiography and subsequent education within China’s school
systems are limited to the broad and politicized narrative of the Cultural Revolution. As
such, there remains a large gap in how the events of that decade were experienced within
society, including the motivations which drew citizens into the discourse. With the
Communist Party holding complete control over publication, education, and the media,
social memory is shared through state-controlled education and propaganda. What has
worked to fill this gap is the literary genre of scar literature by intellectuals who suffered
and those who came of age during the Cultural Revolution. 53
In his dissertation titled “Cultural Revolution and Collective Memory: the Case of
Five Intellectuals,” Hari Venkatesan draws upon the work of French philosopher and
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs who argued that “Collective frameworks are the
instruments used by collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in
accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society.” According to
Venkatesan, these predominate thoughts of the society are determined in terms of
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sociocultural history and present concerns. In the context of social memory of the
Cultural Revolution, predominant thoughts are influenced by the Resolution of 1981, and
Venkatesan argues that “Even in case of those who retain personal memories of the
Cultural Revolution, the larger historical context within which their experiences are to be
situated is inevitably ‘outsourced’ and thus subject to mediation.”54 These aspects
attribute the Cultural Revolution generation being hailed as the “lost generation” because
even within their own history, their personal experiences remain lost and unsubstantiated.
Within literature published by intellectuals who lived through the Cultural
Revolution, events of importance differ greatly from the Resolution of 1981. As the Party
experienced power struggles, intellectuals faced the campaign to destroy four olds, house
raids, struggle sessions, and in some cases detention. While these experiences remain
absent from the Party’s official Resolution, their importance is invaluable, for they
“complement the official narrative by offering readers a narrative of how the Cultural
Revolution was experienced by one of its main victims: the intellectuals.”55 Personal
narratives are crucial for understanding the on the ground turmoil wrought by Mao’s
campaigns to exterminate bourgeois elements, deeply fleshing out the broad and brief
official narrative. Dissatisfaction with present assessments of the Cultural Revolution is
quoted as reasons motivating the authors of many scar literature memoirs to make a
record of their personal experiences. 56 These memoirs and personal experiences explain
the motivations driving individuals to act as they did, combating ignorance in the official
narrative towards the factors which drove the events of the Cultural Revolution.
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Within his study, Venkatesan looks at two semi-official narratives of the Cultural
Revolution which can be found in mainland China. The first text, The Decade of Great
Chaos, was written in 1989 by Wang Nianyi, a Professor of Communist Party history at
the PLA University of National Defense in China. Venkatesan considers that Wang’s
narrative, while exhaustive, remains an account of major political events that took place
during the Cultural Revolution. 57 What remains absent in Wang’s account is how the
Cultural Revolution affected society, providing little detail on the ordeal of intellectuals,
the factors and people responsible, and what galvanized people to Mao’s call. Wang’s
narrative instead concludes that Mao intended to create a new society through the
Cultural Revolution after harboring misgivings as to the direction China was headed. 58
The Decade of Great Chaos follows the Resolution of 1981 as its central framework.
Another work which Venkatesan analyzed was Jin Chunming’s A Draft History of
the Great Cultural Revolution published in 1995. Jin, a researcher in the Central Party
School of China, created a narrative which like the Resolution is broad in scope.
Venkatesan notes that while Jin talks about the ordeals of Chinese people and makes
references to the arbitrary arrests and harsh treatment faced by many, he does not dwell
upon them in detail. Much like Wang’s account, specific details are left missing as to
how the revolution was conducted by Red Guards and what drove people to deal out
harsh treatments and arrests to intellectuals. 59 In short both of these semi-narratives
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which have been made available to the Chinese people, the history written falls short of
delivering the driving forces and agencies of individuals during the Cultural Revolution,
remaining largely sanitized.
Inevitably, such a gap between official and semi-officials historical narratives
created a discourse between the Party’s account of the Cultural Revolution and the
personal memories of those who experienced it. This discourse in turn began to form
between those who held personal memories of the decade and subsequent generations
who heavily rely on the Party’s narrative to ascertain what occurred from 1966 to 1976.
For those in the post-80s generations, who have no personal memory of the Cultural
Revolution, their social memory and knowledge of the period comes from the sources
available which shed light on the topic, including schooling, personal studying of the
period, and verbal recollections from those who experienced the Cultural Revolution
first-hand. The strongest voice from these sources remains what the Party has presented
as the official history taught through compulsory education. Such education occurs at a
period where children are highly impressionable and lack the ability to challenge the
subject matter presented, thus indoctrinating China’s youth to the Party’s history
pertaining to the Cultural Revolution.

2.5 Publication Restrictions and Education

In the People’s Republic of China, history textbooks and educational curriculum
standards published by the Ministry of Education strictly adhere to the historical narrative
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as presented by the Resolution of 1981. The Content Standards listed under the Junior
Middle School’s “History and Society” Curriculum Standards contain objectives of the
course and suggested activities. With reference to the Cultural Revolution, under
suggested activities it is mentioned that “Where possible students must be encouraged to
conduct surveys, visits, interviews etc. to understand the value of first-hand resources.
However, with regard to major events such as the socialist transformation or ‘Cultural
Revolution,’ the teacher must provide guidance and explanation.” 60 Therefore it can be
extrapolated that current youth in China are not encouraged to learn about the Cultural
Revolution through firsthand accounts by engaging with family or community members
or by reading literary memoirs. From this content standard, it is evident that teachers are
not to encourage students to seek alternate recollections or views of these sensitive
historical subjects. Through this academic standard, the teacher becomes the Party’s
mouthpiece in teaching the history as presented by the official Resolution of 1981.
For the history course presented to Senior Middle Schools (grades 10-12), the
curriculum is unsurprisingly simplistic. The outline reads:
The ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ that started in 1966 was an
internal chaos caused by the erroneous leadership and its exploitation by
counter-revolutionary groups that brought upon a great calamity on the
Party, country and people of all nationalities. The broad masses of cadres,
Party members and people struggled to contain the ‘Cultural Revolution.’
Lin Biao and Jiang Qing’s counterrevolutionary groups were smashed.
The ‘Cultural Revolution’ ended in 1976.

In addition to being presented as simplistic, this historical overview does not delve into
the effects of the decade on intellectuals, nor does it invite independent research or
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knowledge into the subject on behalf of the students. Furthermore Mao’s influence during
this period is diminished and he remains in his role of founder of the People’s Republic.
Instead a broad and political narrative heavily influenced by the Resolution of 1981 is
presented.
What are missing from the narrative presented to the post-1980s generation are
the motivations behind the Cultural Revolution’s history, and the driving forces that
caused the nation’s people to act as the Party describes as a state of “chaos” and “turmoil.”
Instead what remains presented by the Party’s narrative is a misstep in political actions
that resulted in turmoil and chaos, a belief that this study will later prove continues to be
presented as the leading social narrative of the Cultural Revolution as shown through the
Chinese Internet.
Chinese writer Murong Xuecun fears that this lack of historical education is
having negative consequences on the minds of China’s post-80’s generation. Murong
writes that, “the young generation only believes official pronouncements; some even
think contradicting the official line is heretical. They do not bother to check the details.”61
He continues to note that this generation suffers from an “inability-to-accept-facts”
syndrome,” believing what they want to with the inability to believe facts that contradict
or oppose their own views and what has been taught to them. His belief is not surprising
considering China’s academic standards on glossing over any missteps taken by the Party
throughout modern history. The post-80’s generation is not taught to question the Party’s
history or seek alternate sources of knowledge. Instead they take the official Party line at
face value and consider outside sources of information biased.
61

Murong Xuecun, “Let Them Eat Grass,” Foreign Policy, January 2, 2013.

36

Murong’s comments come after a Gansu official took to his blog on April 26,
2012 to defend Mao’s image against “people spreading slander” about millions who died
in rural areas due to the Great Leap Forward. His post brought in thousands of frenzied
comments from young netizens, many who agreed that the famine did not occur, or was
not as extreme as scholars outside China note.62 Netizens left comments such as “if there
was no rice, why didn’t they eat meat?” and “if so many people starved to death, where
are the mass graves.”63 Comments such as these highlight the historical ignorance and
lack of educational background of the post-80’s generation. This online discussion
showcases a lack of critical thinking fostered by a political system which obscures any
knowledge that contradicts its official narrative.
Scholarly work on the subject remains limited in mainland China and has been in
place since the late 1980’s. In 1988 a regulation was issued stating “from now on and for
quite some time, publishing firms should not plan the publication of dictionaries or other
handbooks about the ‘Great Cultural Revolution.” It went on to say that “under normal
circumstances, one should not plan to publish titles specifically researching the ‘Great
Cultural Revolution’ or specifically telling the history of the ‘Great Cultural
Revolution.’”64 From this directive it is clear that a large roadblock lies in the way for
scholars and researchers in presenting new data or research into the Cultural Revolution.
At the same time, younger generations have only the official Party line to learn about the
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Cultural Revolution, as scholarly work aiming to debate or discuss the events of that
decade remain purposefully absent.
In his study, Venkatesan notes a banned history text that questions the
motivations behind the Cultural Revolution, and in presenting the piece, notes how it
threatens the Party’s official narrative. The text, History of the Decade of the Cultural
Revolution, was never openly released in China.65 In the preface, author Gao Gao stressed
the necessity for historical research into the period, writing that “a nation that is unable to
learn lessons from calamities is a nation that has no future….There is a necessity to
strengthen socialist democracy and the building up of a legal system. Through a reform
of the political system, a highly democratic socialist political system should be setup. It is
only in this way that upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution can be prevented
effectively.”66 Calling out the Party’s dangerously condensed history of the Cultural
Revolution, Gao Gao challenges the Party’s legitimacy by voicing a necessity for
political reform as a means to prevent future upheavals. While this study will later show
in chapter four how Party officials and Chinese web users today are turning to the
internet to voice misgivings that another period of turmoil such as the Cultural
Revolution could be imminent, this is not occurring at the hands of political reform. On
the contrary, the Party stresses a strengthening of the Communist’s power of rule in order
to protect against future chaos.
In a subsequent interview, authors Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi challenge the Party’s
legitimacy by arguing that the overly simplistic negation of the Cultural Revolution at the
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hands of Deng “hinders democratization” in China. The authors claim that further
research into the Cultural Revolution “could reveal that while the Cultural Revolution
seemed like an era of unprecedented democracy, it was yet another case of masses being
manipulated by the regime.” 67 With authors vocally challenging the Party’s narrative of
the Cultural Revolution, it is not surprising that the text remains banned in China. The
Party in turn sees works such as this as counter-narratives threatening the solidarity of the
state and the forward-movement of society.
The drafting which went into the Resolution of 1981 proves that the social and
historical narrative of the Cultural Revolution has been heavily constructed to benefit the
needs of the Party. The Central Committee of the Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping
laid out the events of the decade in broad terms, highlighting personal faults rather than
political failures, as to protect the legitimacy of the Party. What remained absent from the
official history were the voices of the people, an element that has since been made
available through personal memoirs and scar literature though discouraged from study in
China’s public school academic standards. These emotional works seek to bridge the gap
that’s missing between the Party’s politicized history and the actions, emotions, and
agencies of the people.
Finally, the Resolution of 1981 heavily influenced what youth have been taught
about the Cultural Revolution through the public school system. This education, or lack
thereof, is one that is overly simplistic and again lacking the personal histories that could
be made readily available to students. These educational standards discourage students
from independent learning about the period, just as the Communist Party continues to
67
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limit research and publications on the mainland. In short, the Communist Party has
worked to create a history of the Cultural Revolution that is meant to induce fear and
uncertainty, by presenting China’s younger generations with an overly simplified
explanation of how social upheaval can be caused. This leads to the use and misuse of the
memory of the Cultural Revolution in China’s post-80’s generation, as demonstrated best
through the modern internet.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CHINESE INTERNET AS A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES

The Chinese Internet is unlike any other international internet network, becoming
accessible to the public in 1994. The Chinese government employs strict network
monitoring controls which heavily limit public access to international websites, making
the internet largely homogeneous. In his article “A Chinese Internet? History, Practice,
and Globalization,” China scholar Guobin Yang argues that the internet in China has
become domesticated, or localized, to such a degree that it is “necessary to talk about the
Chinese Internet, as opposed to the Internet in China.” 68 Yang continues that “localized”
in terms of the Chinese Internet does not mean that the network is not global, but that
even within its global features the Chinese Internet has “assumed distinctly Chinese
characteristics.”69 Chinese netizens rely largely on these domestic websites for
consumption of media, entertainment, news, and social interaction. And the Chinese
Internet is also a place of consumption and discussion of historical periods which have
become taboo to discuss offline, such as the Cultural Revolution.
At present the Chinese Internet contains the most netizens of any other nation of
the world, with more netizens than the total population of the United States. As such, the
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Chinese Internet has evolved into a powerful tool used by netizens for citizen action and
has strengthened political efficacy. It is the size of the China’s netizen population that has
created a system of checks and balances on the Chinese Internet; a system which
monitors citizens and government officials alike, an echo of Chinese historical culture. It
is this system which has caused researchers to draw comparisons between Chinese
netizens and Red Guards, a term that this study will later show has dangerous
connotations.
The power behind the Chinese Internet will be discussed in order to investigate
the environment and the netizens who utilize the web to propagate a social memory of the
Cultural Revolution. First, web statistics will be analyzed to determine who is logging
into Chinese cyberspace, and for what purposes. After showing the larger number of
post-80’s youth who dominate the Chinese Internet, this research will discuss how web
these users have taken control of the Chinese Internet in order to increase their political
efficacy. Chinese have taken this technology and created their own built-environment
using it to advocate for various rights and causes. The online phenomena Human Flesh
Search will be linked to internet surveillance and supervision of the people, by the people.
This online movement has caused some China watchers to draw dangerous similarities
between netizens and Red Guards, leaving some researchers to refer to Chinese web users
as “cyber mobs” and “Red Guards 2.0.” As the power of the internet grows, references
have been made between the evolution of communication on the internet from wall
posters of the Mao years to modern web forums. Analysis will be given to this evolution
as a link between the two periods. Finally, the modern internet will be grounded in
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historical precedence, as encouragement of citizen monitoring is rooted in both Chinese
imperial history and the Cultural Revolution.

3.1 The Chinese Internet

Every year the China Internet Network and Information Center (CNNIC) releases
its “Statistical Report on Internet Development in China.” The CNNIC is the principal
agency responsible for internet affairs hosted under the Ministry of Information
Industry.70 The Statistical Report collects vital demographics of who is logging into the
Chinese Internet, from where, and what their main activities are online. It also documents
trends in the overall growth of the Chinese Internet and mobile communication networks.
The CNNIC collects its data by surveying permanent residents aged six or above through
fixed phone lines, either at home, at a dormitory, or by use of a cellular phone. 71 The
content of the survey includes “whether interviewees surf the internet, their background,
the internet access behavior of Internet users, online depth and online experience, etc.”72
A subsequent online survey which gathered detailed information on the use of typical
internet applications was placed on the CNNIC website and shared with the public
through online government and entertainment portals. 73 The CNNIC hails the
extensiveness of the phone survey, using telecom data in China to account for 94.2% of
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the population having access to a phone, claiming “the hypothesis underpinning this
survey is that the number of Internet users un-covered by any phone is negligible.”74
Therefore the agency claims this method presents the most accurate image of Chinese
internet use.
In its twenty-ninth report released in January 2012, the CNNIC reported an
increase in Chinese Internet users of 55.8 million for a total of over 513 million, out of
China’s population of 1.4 billion. The data also reported an increase in the internet
penetration rate of 4%, bringing the rate up to 38.3%.75 This growth in the number of
Chinese citizens logging into the internet has been growing steady throughout the past
decade. China is the nation with the most internet users, with only a third of its
population regularly accessing the internet, and is steadily outpacing its opponents.
China’s internet penetration rate of 38.3% is above the global average of 30.2%, and
there is much development underway to increase internet activity among rural areas. 76
The internet in China is increasingly becoming more accessible to netizens at home,
enabling Chinese to spend more time online and use the internet for increased purposes
such as online shopping, social interaction, and a means of entertainment. The alternative
to logging in at home is through visiting a cyber café, which tailors services to patrons
interested in online gaming. In 2011 the number of netizens logging in at cyber-cafes
dropped 7.8%, signifying that internet access is becoming increasingly more common
within Chinese homes, and that more users are logging in at home than at cyber-cafes.
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Figure 1: Growth of China’s Internet Population (2004-2011).77
Among China’s netizen population, students make up the largest swath of netizen
demographics. In its January 2012 report, the CNNIC reported a rise in the number of
high school students utilizing the internet from 32.8% to 35.7%, with students of all ages
overall making up 30.2% of the Chinese Internet’s population. 78 Of the percentage of
students logging on, nearly 70% are students in junior and senior high school, and 21%
are college students. Furthermore, youth aged ten to thirty comprise over 82% of China’s
netizens, with 73.5% of these netizens logging in from urban areas within China. While
China’s post-80’s generation make up the largest portion of China’s netizens, a severe
education gap remains on the Chinese Internet. This education gap among netizens is
widespread, with the CNNIC reporting in 2012 that only 11.5% of Chinese internet users
held a university degree or higher.79 These demographics help to profile the average
Chinese netizen as being in their late high school or early college years, certainly part of
China’s post-80s generation. Looking at figure two below, this becomes evident as over
82% of those who log onto the web are within that age range.
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Figure 2: Age structure of internet users (Dec. 2010-2011).80
Examining the CNNIC’s January 2012 report also indicates how the average
Chinese netizen spends their time online. Over 80% of netizens use the internet for
instant messaging, and 63.2% use the internet to access video games and connect with
other gamers throughout China and the world. 81 In 2011, the amount of digitally
published blogs and personal spaces increased by 24 million to 319 million. 82 These
blogs are active hubs which netizens use to share news, activities, and opinions. Many of
these blogs are linked to micro-blogging websites such as Twitter or Sina Weibo. Social
media includes websites which allow for social interaction among large groups of people,
with accessible and widespread publishing privileges. Microblogs allow users to post
thoughts and commentary within a limited span of characters. Blogs differ from
microblogs, allowing users to post content without any character limit. Each medium
allows users to follow and share content with one another, while also allowing users to
design their profiles to create a personal space within the online community.
Micro-blogging websites are active communities for the sharing of both domestic
and international news and information. The ability for users to comment on and share
80
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posts by other netizens makes these social hubs extremely import to both researchers and
government officials in gauging public sentiment in China. It is within these communities
that this research draws most of its analysis of how the Cultural Revolution’s memory
resonates with China’s post-80’s generation. In 2011, the CNNIC reported that the
amount of micro-blog accounts in China rose 296% to 250 million users. Similarly,
accounts on Chinese social networking websites also rose to 244 million users. 83 This
steep jump is attributed both to increased web accessibility, and to the popularity of
social media services released from social media giant Sina. From these statistics, it
becomes evident that nearly half of all Chinese netizens log into the internet to use microblogging and social networking services.
Recently the Chinese Internet has seen a divide amongst its web population
between two groups: the baifumei, literally meaning the “good-looking and rich,” and the
grassroots web users. In the 2012 China Internet White Paper, Gongtao Zhang, a senior
analyst at IDG-Accel in Guangzhou discusses how these two terms have become popular
ways of describing divergent groups of Chinese Internet users.84 In his article, “Internet
Users: The Gap Between Baifumei and Grassroots,” Zhang defines baifumei as urban
elite, largely educated, internet-savvy professionals, the grassroots label applies to
China’s growing population of novice, uneducated internet users.85 Zhang argues that the
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formation of these two groups, or the “digital gap” that has grown between them,
corresponds to the imbalance present in Chinese society and educational system.
This digital gap exists mainly between the urban centers of East China and the
rural countryside of Midwest China. Urban cities and large towns have an average
internet penetration rate of 54.6%, while the rate in rural areas is only 20.7%. 86 Rural
Chinese attribute the lack of access to and education about information technology as the
main obstacle for accessing the internet. Lack of access to education about the internet
and technological advances is one of the main obstacles in the development of the
internet into rural areas. In a 2011 poll, 57.8% of respondents categorizing themselves as
rural non-users of the internet attributed “computer/internet illiteracy” as their primary
reason for not logging online. 87 This stark divide in the Chinese Internet’s demographic
proves that accessing the internet in China remains a largely urban activity, profiling the
average internet user as from China’s post-80’s generation logging in from an urban area.

3.2 Internet Control

Regardless of the level of control and monitoring stigmatizing the Chinese
Internet, netizens are able to appropriate the web for their own purposes. In his article
“The Curious Case of Jia Junpeng,” Guobin Yang discusses how an enigmatic online
posting became a popular location for netizens and Chinese youth to express their
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frustrations about a delayed launch of a popular online game. 88 Using an enigmatic social
media post calling for a boy named “Jia Junpeng” to return home as a case study, Yang
analyzes the levels of control netizens have in an otherwise controlled society. Similarly,
China’s forerunning social media and blogging platforms, such as Sina and RenRenWang
depend on user-created content to stimulate discussion, participation, and traffic. 89
This digitally-built environment works to expand the political efficacy of netizens.
Examining Sina Weibo, the Chinese micro-blogging service equivalent to Twitter, it
becomes apparent that netizens who use the service are enjoying new opportunities for
communication never before found in China. While some urban users of Weibo are
finding themselves required to register to the micro-blogging service using their real
names, for the most part Weibo users retain a large degree of anonymity while using the
service.90 This anonymity equates to less fear of their content falling under the eye of
government censors and being deleted or offending their followers who hold differing
opinions. 91 Weibo also allows users to comment on tweets and shared tweets,
encouraging user interaction in a way which is absent from Twitter. In this sense,
netizens gain confidence that they have the ability to discuss current events and share
their political viewpoints, creating an active web community comprised mainly of young
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Chinese who freely share their opinions and social commentary through these social
media platform.
Appropriations of internet forums reflect social sentiments, and often depict a
sense of alienation and isolation in contemporary life. In the case of the Jia Junpeng
posting, it “became an occasion for expressing their frustration” and discussion soon
veered off the topic of the video game’s delayed release to angered sentiments over
government corruption and consumer dissatisfaction.92 Yang believes Chinese
cyberspace has its own “zones of indifference,” where state power does not penetrate and
obstruct netizen expression and content.93 It is within these zones, or online communities,
that netizens are able to freely vent their frustrations and become critical of their
environment. On one hand, the Chinese Internet is heavily monitored by the Chinese
central government. Individual networking accounts can be censored and entire networks
can be shut down by small control centers. However, many of these zones of indifference
are of little concern to state monitoring.
As in the Jia Junpeng case, gaming forums often attract little monitoring attention,
and topics rarely center on Chinese current affairs. Yang argues, and rightfully so, that it
is within these topics of indifference, or “everyday-life issues that do not touch on the
state’s central nerve systems,” that people begin to make a difference.94 In many cases,
calls for social advocacy and justice are masked within gaming forums. In other instances,
language is masked using codified terminology and slang to bypass government censors.
And finally, in some cases, netizens seek to improve issues of social morality which pose
92

Yang, “The Curious Case of Jia Junpeng.”
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
93

50

no threat to the state, shown no better than through the grass roots power of Human
Flesh Search.
Human Flesh Search (HFS) is a recent phenomenon on the Chinese internet which
involves collaborative online behavior conducted by netizens. 95 Leading HFS scholars
Yu-Hui Tao and Chian-Hsueng Chao of the National University of Kaoshiung, Taiwan
define HFS as “an act of searching information about individuals or any subjects through
the online collaboration of multiple users.” 96 Chao describes the typical timeline of
actions related to HFS collaboration:
A search of this kind often starts with an open query for information about
any topics, and a query can be initiated out of any motives, such as pure
curiosity about a celebrity’s private information, or to track down a
potential interest. However, for the majority of high-profile search cases,
especially in China, these searches have turned to aggressive, vicious
manhunts. Often times, subjects of searches were perceived to be
wrongdoers and the searches brought unwanted publicity to the sought,
sometimes leading to public humiliation both online and in real life. On
one hand, the practices have been accused of privacy violation and
defamation by victims, concerned intellectuals and sympathetic citizens.
On the other hand, it has also been supported and applauded by others as a
form of citizen empowerment and civil participation. 97
Essentially, Chinese netizens organize through the collective power behind popular web
forums, entertainment websites, and microblogs to quickly find obscure information and
identify seemingly anonymous internet personalities who attract the ire of netizens.
Targets that attract netizen attention are those at the center of issues that drive at the heart

95

From the Chinese 人肉搜索, literally “Human Flesh Search Engine.” While this is the phenomena’s
colloquial term, a more comprehensive name might be “human-powered” search. Instances of such internet
vigilantism remain absent on western internet networks. HFS equivalents have been researched in South
Korea and Taiwan.
96
Yu-Hui Tao and Chian-Hsueng Chao, “Analysis of Human Flesh Search in the Taiwanese Context,”
IEEE Computer Society (2011): 187.
97
Chian-Hsueng Chao, “Reconceptualizing the Mechanism of Internet Human Flesh Search: A Review of
the Literature.” IEEE Computer Society (2011): 650.

51

of China’s social and moral issues, including corrupt officials, nationalized current events,
and moral standards of Chinese society. Through clever investigative work, netizens
track down an individual's identity with the goal of bringing about “justice,” often
causing the individual in question to be fired, shamed, or punished offline. 98 This
personal information is shared online and commented upon by thousands of netizens,
denouncing the target while commenting on the larger social issue the HFS case speaks to.
The term was first coined in 2001 to describe a search engine-based website that
used human collaboration to uncover information rather than machines or computerbased search processes. 99 However, its use became widespread after 2006 when a video
of an anonymous woman crushing a kitten with her shoe was posted to a Chinese website.
The woman became dubbed the “Kitten Killer of Hangzhou.”100 Chinese web users
quickly discerned the woman’s identity and used this information to harass the woman
and garner media attention, prompting government involvement, and ultimately leading
to the woman’s job termination.
HFS as a movement has gathered the attention of western media and scholars both
domestically and internationally. Those who document the search argue that it holds both
positive and negative qualities. Its attributes include massive participation and fast
turnaround, voluntary and diverse contributors, progressive and interconnected search
methods, and having profound impacts on Chinese social commentary. Netizens hold a
power of checks that is otherwise absent in offline society. Previous HFS instances hold
the benefits of truth revelation and news sharing, fighting against illegal and unethical
98
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behavior such as corruption, and promoting the internet as the leading source of media
and consumption.101 Drawbacks include privacy invasion, low information quality, and in
some instances, violence.
Tao believes there is a need for increased HFS research, especially as instances of
this massive online collaboration continue to grow in Asian countries such as China and
Taiwan. Tao believes “any country or region with a significant number of HFS incidents
should have more HFS research written in English to provide a wider access of HFS
development and research for the international community.” 102 As the field of online
collaboration studies grows, phenomena such as HFS attracts the attention of numerous
fields of study, including sociology, psychology, legal studies, and computer science.
However, current historical research is absent from HFS studies, and this study will place
HFS as a movement into a historical and political context.

3.3 Virtual Wall Posters

Western media pundits and China-watchers alike have referred to HFS and the
netizens behind it as “internet vigilantes” and “Red Guards 2.0,” which will be further
analyzed in chapter four. Other scholars relate the power of Chinese web forums and
social media to an evolution in communication techniques, also with roots moving
through the Cultural Revolution. Guobin Yang, associate professor at the University of
Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication and Department of Sociology, is
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the forerunner of placing trends of the Chinese Internet into historical context. Yang has
completed one book and numerous articles which delve into the Chinese Internet, its
make-up, and various online trends. His book, The Power of the Internet in China lays
the foundation of this study.103 Throughout his work Yang compares online blackboard
systems (BBS), a type of web forum, with big-character posters, or large, wall-mounted
posters which acted as a means of propaganda, communication, and protest most notably
during the Mao years. 104 Used in many western nations as a tool for educational purposes,
BBS in China is an online place of social interaction. Often compared to as wall posters
by netizens, BBS postings have become a “prime space for producing contentious and
critical discourse in China.” 105 Much like wall posters have been a form of expressing
dissent and protest, the dynamics of BBS and social media on the Chinese Internet, as
shown through instances of HFS, hold tremendous power.
Wall posters have evolved as a form of communication from the time of Mao to
the internet age. Yang’s article, “Media, Power, and Protest in China: From the Cultural
Revolution to the Internet” is a strong piece for noting this evolution. 106 During the
Cultural Revolution, wall posters were put up along heavily frequented gathering spots,
mass debates arose between Red Guard groups, and protesting was a public
performance.107 Wall posters were posted in central locations and attracted crowds of
viewers, providing materials for discussion and debate. The Red Guards were established
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at Qinghua University middle school after the group posted a wall poster announcing its
identity with members signing it as “Red Guards.” 108 Urban university campuses were
the site of many protests and wall posters adorned the courtyards during the early years of
the Cultural Revolution, and similarly, today urban university students make up the bulk
of China’s netizen population.
Internet postings and microblog posts are virtual wall posters. Yang argues that
like wall posters, “they are mostly produced by individuals, posted in public spaces, and
express personal views.”109 But unlike wall posters, BBS postings are less constrained by
time and space than putting up wall posters. Dissemination is also wider and faster. BBS
postings online also hold a scale of interaction that is unmatched by the offline physical
spaces which wall posters might occupy. It is these new virtual wall posters which
powers internet trends such as HFS. Through microblogs, BBS, and instant messaging
services, young netizens are sharing their grievances and rallying behind one another to
find other netizens who share common ideals and social beliefs.
While HFS is not a political movement, the Chinese government is not immune to
exposure by it. Numerous HFS have been conducted to uncover corrupt officials,
spreading their stories across cyberspace and making their names synonymous with the
netizen-deemed wrongful actions they committed. The most infamous of cases involved
Zhou Jiugeng, a state official in Nanjing. Photos of Zhou wearing an expensive watch
and smoking foreign cigarettes began to gather attention on the Chinese Internet.
Netizens questioned how someone on Zhou’s salary could afford such luxury items. After
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his name appeared in over 4,600 blog posts, the Jiangning district government began an
official investigation into his assets, ultimately leading to his termination. 110 Due to a lag
in Chinese law to keep up with the digital age, there are no reprecussions against netizens
for invasion of privacy.
It can be argued that this citizen-controlled power over Chinese officials is a
dangerous product of the digital age. The cyber surveillance at work behind HFS has led
some to call the internet a “power equalizer.”111 While western media applaud Chinese
activist-netizens, they assume such actions are soon to fall prey to government censors
and that the Communist Party will strengthen its network control. 112 What these western
media stories fail to report on is that HFS and the work of Chinese netizens has been
embraced by the Communist Party in China and state media. While HFS against corrupt
officials often results in said official’s termination, there is no threat made against the
Communist Party’s central authority. As is often the case, HFS corruption cases target
low-level officials in regional posts, acting as a system of checks for local-level
governments. Central government figures and Communist Party leaders remain absent in
human flesh corruption searches. In fact, the central government emerges as the victor
from HFS activity, as its figureheads heed the call of netizens by investigating and, more
often than not, terminating officials who fall prey to HFS. The internet acts as a safety
valve for netizens to release steam while avoiding protests. In the end, the central
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government retains its legitimacy while supporting citizen empowerment and allowing
increased transparency.
One of the main themes underpinning HFS is the power of anonymity on the
internet and the different ways which anonymity both aids and hurts those involved. On
one side of the issue are the netizens who frequent these online discussion forums,
sharing news stories and gossip concerning individuals whom they deem to be morally
improper. These netizens perform the investigative work that empowers HFS, discerning
the target’s identity, and sharing the story to make the individual notorious. These
netizens are anonymous, using usernames and web handles that often times do not require
personal verification.
On the other side of HFS you have the individuals who are being exposed by
netizens, such as the Kitten Killer of Hangzhou or Zhou Jiugeng. These individuals
become notorious throughout the Chinese internet community overnight, and their
personal information is uncovered and displayed for all to see, which has begun to lead to
offline attacks and harassment, with netizens check the moral authority of said
individuals. In one HFS against Lobsang Gendun, a Tibetan wrongly accused as being a
protester of the Olympic torch relay in Paris, France. Due to his activity working
alongside Free Tibet organizations, his home address, phone number, as well as satellite
images of his neighborhood and house were posted to a Chinese forum resulting in
threatening phone calls at all hours of the night.113 Cases such as this portray the recent
shift of online actions and harassment moving offline, and some netizens have made note
between such behaviors of those targeted and persecuted during the Cultural Revolution.
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For those who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, a dichotomy existed
between those who were targeted and the masses who denounced them. And similar to
HFS, there were very few repercussions for those who instigated violence during the
Cultural Revolution by means of China’s legal system.
Leading Chinese director Chen Kaige recently released his new film “Caught in
the Web” which depicts the negative aspects of privacy invasion associated with HFS. In
an interview with the New York Times, Chen confessed that his personal memories of
living through the Cultural Revolution inspired the filmography. Chen recalled working
with young revolutionaries against his father in the 1960s, and envisioned Chinese
netizens used in his film adopting the mentality of the young revolutionaries of the
1960s.114 Chen admits to having mixed feelings to netizens and HFS in China, being
quoted as saying, “On the one hand, I’ve seen the positive side. On the other hand, can
you abuse the freedom of speech to attack people? Are you going to play a role like a
judge? Because that reminds me of the Cultural Revolution.”115
Chen isn’t the only intellectual making references between HFS and the Cultural
Revolution. HFS has become a phrase that encompasses the overwhelming power that the
Chinese internet and its 550 million netizens hold, a power that is shaped from their
ability to use the internet as a means for research and connectivity, and the internet’s
ability to quickly gather groups. The internet in turn becomes a platform of empowerment;
a medium for releasing anger over social injustices that go unnoticed offline and by the
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Communist government. However, many questions remain as to how far this power will
go.

3.4 Historical Precedence

The concept of group censorship and watchdog mentality is not new to digital
China. Community vigilantism had been practiced in Imperial China since the Song
Dynasty (960-1279) as a means of extending the power of the local governments down to
a level of direct contact with subjects. This vigilante system, known as baojia, was first
introduced by Wang Anshi, the Vice Chief Councilor in charge of administration during
the Song dynasty. 116 In 1069, Wang presented his New Policies, with the longest lasting
policy being the baojia system, a plan which organized households into groups of tens
(bao) and hundreds (jia) for collection responsibility to maintain order and report
crimes. 117 The baojia system created a mutual surveillance and protection web that relied
on community members to maintain local law and order. All parties within each baojia
were responsible with overseeing the moral conduct and behaviors of those within the
community. In addition to sustaining community safety, each baojia was also responsible
for supplying the government with armed militiamen.
During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the formality of the baojia disappeared,
with local officials given the choice of continuing with this monitoring system. 118 In 1644
under the Machu Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), Price Regent Dorgon set out to establish an
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empire-wide monitoring system modeled on baojia.119 In 1740, the baojia system merged
with the lijia tax and census collecting system, ultimately strengthening the baojia’s
effectiveness. The structure of each baojia differed from the system established by Wang
Anshi. The Qing baojia consisted of 10 families forming a jia and ten jias forming a bao.
Each bao was overseen by an elected chief. This merger “extended the functions of the
police system, giving the baojia a better surveillance mechanism. Each group of ten
neighboring families was to be held mutually responsible for misdemeanors and crimes
committed by all its members and for reporting the presence of strangers and all persons
who committed improper deeds.”120 The system began as an effective means of
monitoring local communities but began to deteriorate by the mid-nineteenth century. In
Village Governance in North China, 1875-1936, author Ju Dongzu writes that by this
period the system “on the whole was ineffective” and merely remained as a
“formality.”121
While monitoring fellow citizens through the internet has its roots in the social
structure of policies dating back from imperial times, the roots of citizen monitoring over
the government began in the years preceding the Cultural Revolution. In 1956, ten years
before the onset of the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi delivered a report to the Eighth
National Congress of the Communist Party. At the time of the report, Liu served as the
First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China. During the Cultural Revolution
Liu was branded a traitor by Mao and was expelled from the Party. In his report titled,
“The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Liu
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addressed the need for “vigorous self-criticism” within the Party. This criticism was to
“rely on supervision by the masses of the working people as whole.” 122 Liu stressed that
all criticisms and exposures from below must be encouraged and supported in order to
strengthen the Party. The masses were granted a checking power to hold over Party
cadres as a balance of power. Liu also noted that anyone within the Party who aimed to
suppress the people or seek revenge on the critics would be duly punished.
This need for Party supervision by the masses was reiterated in 1957 by an
editorial in the People’s Daily a leading newspaper noted for being the Party’s
mouthpiece which was widely read during the Mao years. In the piece, an excerpt from a
report delivered at a meeting of cadres in Xi’an, it is noted that a system from the bottom,
or the supervision by the masses over the Party, should be expanded. By heeding this call,
the Party would in turn become better informed and more prudent, and avoid one-sided
approaches to solving societal problems. Within the editorial, the People’s Daily made
clear the consequences at stake for not heeding the people’s supervision over the Party:
In China who is in a vulnerable position to make big mistakes? None other
than the Chinese Communist Party. When it makes such mistakes, the
effects are most widespread, so the Party should be particularly careful...If
we do not accept supervision or work to expand democracy within the
Party and the state, we shall surely cut ourselves off from the masses and
make big mistakes. 123
With this editorial, the Party stressed the need to rely on the masses and place supervisory
powers onto them in order to strengthen the Party and combat corruption and on-sided
thinking. By granting the masses supervisory powers, the Party aroused their initiative
and encouraged the people to have a stake in the Party’s future.
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Highly reminiscent of the Mao years, the People’s Daily recently threw its
support and encouragement behind the checks and balancing of power behind netizens in
fighting corruption. In September 2012 the newspaper turned to its Sina Weibo account,
posting:124
Only by exposing public power under the sun can we effectively restrict
public power; only by enabling everyone to become a supervisor of the
government can corruption find nowhere to hide. When the occasional
cases of online anti-corruption evolve to become a powerful method of
supervision, when the ‘accidental’ becomes the ‘normal,’ online anticorruption [movements] can act as an institutional power.125
The People’s Daily, used this tweet to urge online corruption monitoring by netizens.
Instead of calling for an end to government corruption or the creation of a government
bureau aimed at curbing a problem that has been plaguing China for decades, the
People’s Daily is instead encouraging netizens to call out and monitor corruption. This
tweet is reminiscent of the above piece published by the People’s Daily prior to the
Cultural Revolution in which the Party encouraged the people to monitor local officials in
order to strength power and solidify the core central leadership.
The Chinese Communist Party does not abide by an official monitoring system by
its citizens as the baojia system established during the years of Imperial China, nor has
the Party mandated an all-out call for a system of checks as it did in the years leading up
to the Cultural Revolution. However it is evident through the People’s Daily’s tweet
supporting citizens corruption monitoring and the government’s record of listening to the
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will of the people and punishing corrupt officials exposed through HFS, that the
Communist Party supports netizen participation. As Tao writes,
Participation and collaboration by users play a vital role in the HFS
process. On one hand, HFS practices, which are considered a
manifestation of citizen empowerment and civil participation, are
supported and applauded by other countries. On the other, a majority of
high-profile HFS cases in China have become aggressive and vicious,
arousing research interest on the involved legal, privacy, and social
issues. 126
This online participation becomes a double-edged sword for China, where netizens are
able to actively combat corruption and have a voice within the Party, but the threat of
chaos remains as China’s legal system is not keeping up with the privacy and social
concerns such movements hold.
Analyzing the web statistics from the Chinese Internet and determining the
internet’s makeup allows this research to note the large population of post-80s youth and
students utilizing the internet for various purposes. As this study will show in the follow
chapter, this generation is taking to the Chinese web to comment and reconstruct the
social memory of the Cultural Revolution. This chapter made note of the historical
evolutions that have led to the characterization of Chinese cyberspace. Web forums and
BBS are modern equivalents of wall posters, while citizen monitoring over one another
and over Party members and government officials is not a new trait unique to the growing
democracy allowed through the Chinese Internet. Instead monitoring systems have been
encouraged by the Chinese government in various forms for generations as a means to
strengthen a government which serves over the largest population of people on the planet.
Many Chinese youth are calling on these anti-corruption movements to open war against
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bad elements within the Party, openly calling for the persecution of corrupt officials.
Because of this tone which the movement is taking, it is clear that online anti-corruption
efforts are not long-term solutions. Without legal backing, there is no barometer to
measure when the cyber “witch hunts,” as western media has referred to them, have gone
too far. As more and more officials fall victim to the watchful eyes of netizens, online
discussion of the Cultural Revolution grows more prevalent.
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CHAPTER 4
CULTURAL REVOLUTION ONLINE SOCIAL MEMORY

While television and film cannot accurately provide the memories absent from the
younger generations’ education system, neither can government institutions and museums.
When the Beijing National Museum reopened in 2011 after a four-year makeover,
curators devoted only a single photo and three lines of text to the decade-long Cultural
Revolution. 127 With such silence of the period coming out of Beijing’s leading historical
institution, it is not surprising that social memory of the Cultural Revolution continues to
rely heavily on ‘bottom-up’ means. It remains evident that China’s younger generations
do not have the access to accurate memories of the Cultural Revolution. Relying on
bottom-up personal memories discouraged from pursuit in China’s academic standards,
youth turn to the Chines Internet to disseminate and reflect on the legacy of the Cultural
Revolution.
The internet becomes the post-80’s generation’s bottom-up means for
disseminating the history of the Cultural Revolution. This chapter will highlight netizen
comments to grant a voice to Chinese web users and determine how the Party’s official
narrative has constructed the social memory of the Cultural Revolution among China’s
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post-80’s generation. Among the younger generations, the Cultural Revolution signifies a
fear of chaos that permeates this chapter of the Party’s history. The government utilizes
this fear of upheaval and chaos as will be shown through remarks from China’s Premier
Wen who warned against another relapse of Cultural Revolution behavior. Throughout
these instances, netizen comments from social media are provided proving that the
government’s constructed social history continues to reign supreme. Finally, this chapter
concludes by analyzing how western scholars and media pundits of internet studies view
this discourse on the Chinese Internet, and how online movements such as HFS have led
to some referring to Chinese web users as “Internet Red Guards.”
4.1 A “Dark Chapter” vs. Nostalgia

The internet is a crucial tool for spreading social memory in the digital age.
Chinese microbloggers are frequently grappling with reexamining the social memory of
the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the territorial history of Tibet and Taiwan, and the
Cultural Revolution. At present, nearly 64% of Chinese netizens using social media blogs
and microblogs are less than 35 years old, and have thus no personal experience of the
Cultural Revolution.128 Yet the internet is the main location for Chinese students and
youth to both obtain and discuss social and political information, including discussion of
the Cultural Revolution. In his study titled “China’s Social Memory in a Digitalized
World-Assessing the Country’s Narratives in Blogs,” Junhua Zhang, a professor of
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political science at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University, examined the different ways in
which social narratives are presented to Chinese netizens.
Zhang’s study aimed to prove that “a tiny part of the narratives emerging on the
Internet in China, primarily as non-mainstream media in a ‘bottom-up’ form,” actually
work to “enhance a social memory created firstly through official media in a ‘top-down’
way.”129 Through his study, he focused on the impact of bloggers and social media users
on the process of constituting a social memory primarily for young generations on
China’s controlled internet. In the context of his study, Zhang defines social memory as:
The totality of social experiences of a big social group, be it a nation or a
generation. Social memory is embodied in a society’s personal or
vicarious beliefs about the past. These beliefs are shaped mostly through
adopting intergenerational narratives. From the point of view of political
science, social memory is the base of political behavior and thinking of
social groups, because memory of the past is reflected in the view of
today’s world, the vision of the future and the respective values system. 130
The social memory of the Cultural Revolution lives on within those who came of age
during the Cultural Revolution in numerous ways. Some who experienced the Cultural
Revolution wrote scar literature memoirs to share their memories with future generations.
Others became activists and used their experiences during the decade to advocate for
social issues throughout China and the world. 131 For those of China’s digital generation,
social memory of the Cultural Revolution is embodied by the Party’s top-down history.
In order for the post-80’s generation to receive an accurate description of the Cultural
Revolution, the bottom-up memoirs, scholarship, and experiences must be made available.
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Since China’s reform and emergence into the global sphere, the Communist Party
has worked to follow a strict “memory policy” by choosing what should be memorized
and what should be forgotten, especially when it concerns what Zhang calls the “dark
chapters” in the modern history of the Chinese Communist Party. 132 Based on feedback
from interviews conducted in 2010, Zhang argues that discussion of “dark chapters”
within the history and competence of the Party remains one of the foremost topics not for
discussion in any formal media outlet. 133 As chapter two discussed, the ruling Communist
Party made it clear through official documentation how the Cultural Revolution was to be
remembered by the nation, while at the same time placing restrictions on independent
research and scholarly work seeking to elaborate on the events of that decade. This block
placed over what can and cannot be remembered indeed places the Cultural Revolution
into a “dark chapter” of the nation’s history within the minds of its people.
Zhang’s study concluded that the Party’s memory policies are working effectively
on the Chinese Internet. Blogging and social media remains to be a location for selfexpression concerning political and social affairs. Through the acceptance of official
social “memory policy,” adopting “reformist” or neutral stances, most “Chinese bloggers
do not appear to be utilizing this new medium to seriously challenge their government’s
versions of narratives.” 134 At the same time the government’s cultural and propaganda
outlets work to portray this period of history in a rather specific light through media and
entertainment. While entertainment portrayals of the Cultural Revolution aim to invoke
nostalgia for those who lived through the decade, China’s post-80’s generation perpetuate
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the Party’s narrative. Netizens reinforce the Party’s line that the Cultural Revolution was
a period of “chaos” that cannot be repeated, and as such should not be commemorated.
The post-80’s generation does not challenge the Party’s narrative because this
constructed memory was taught to them in school. The social memory of the Cultural
Revolution as prescribed by the Party is one of planned socialization in a top-down
manner through propaganda, school textbooks, approved scholarly work, and museums.
And entertainment representations of the period have also greatly influenced younger
generations through television, film, and photographic collections. The 2006 serial drama
Romantic Life, is a thirty-six episode television series portraying the love and friendship
among several young people from 1968 to 1998. Within the series is a storyline
portraying the main characters living through the Cultural Revolution. The drama, which
caters to a young audience of viewers, depicts the Cultural Revolution nostalgically as a
period of simpler times.
According to an online survey, 83.7% of 1614 votes found the drama to be “very
interesting.” Within an online discussion, netizens left comments such as, “I’m so in love
with that period,” “I wish I could have grown up in that period,” “The zhiqing’s [sentdown youth’s] lives were not bad at all.” 135 These comments reveal the lack of
knowledge and understanding behind this era of Chinese history among younger
generations. The film is absent of the tumultuous political atmosphere of the decade, and
the tense social climate it created. This lack of knowledge, most likely a result of the
absence of Cultural Revolution reflection and study in Chinese public schools, mixed
with the film’s romanticized depiction of events, calls to attention the danger of nostalgia
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consumer culture. In order to counteract this watered-down and inaccurate perception of
the decade, China’s post-80’s generation requires access to the memoirs and scholarship
censored in China.

4.2 Cultural Revolution Memory and the Government

Ruling parties often use social memory to bring the past into present
consciousness, mobilizing it for decisions about the future. This is true of the Communist
Party in China. In an effort to solidify the Communist Party’s legitimacy on the eve of its
ninetieth anniversary, Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency for the People’s
Republic of China, released a statement denouncing any calls for multi-party reform in
China. Released on July 8th, 2011, the statement played upon citizens’ fears of the
Party’s recollections of the disastrous decade, commenting that a multi-party political
system would unleash chaos equal to that of the Cultural Revolution. “If China imitates
the West’s multi-party parliamentary democratic system,” the report read, then “it could
repeat the chaotic and turbulent history of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ when factions sprung
up everywhere.”136 This is the first example of the Party using memories of the chaos of
the Cultural Revolution as a deterrent for democratic reform or multi-party opposition
within China. With this statement, Xinhua successfully created the impression that
having a multiple party system in China will negatively impact society.
Using the memory of the Cultural Revolution to invoke uncertainty occurred
again on March 14, 2012. China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, a well-respected and heavily136
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admired official by netizens, spoke at a press conference following the Fifth Session of
the 11th National People’s Congress. 137 The outgoing Premier highlighted his plea for
political reform by making reference to the Cultural Revolution. Making front page
headlines across Asia, including the Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao, Guangzhou’s
New Express, and the news home page of immensely popular news portal QQ.com, the
Premier’s remarks were as follows:
We must press ahead with both economic reform and political structural
reform, especially reform in the leadership system of our party and
country. Reform has reached a critical stage. Without successful political
structural reform, it is impossible for us to fully institute economic
structural reform and the gains we have made in this area may be lost. The
new problems that have cropped up in China’s society will not be
fundamentally resolved, and such historical tragedies as the Cultural
Revolution may happen again. 138

Premier Wen did not specify which reforms should be implemented, but he did stress that
such reforms had to be “gradual and orderly” and conform with “national
circumstances.”139 The Party has used the label of the Cultural Revolution and the chaos
which it caused to attack political opponents and supporters of multi-party rule. It
remains unclear why the label of the Cultural Revolution was used by Premier Wen, but
its ability to garner large amounts of attention speaks for itself.
By invoking the Cultural Revolution, Premier Wen successfully brought its
memory back into the public discourse and the people’s attention. His broad statement
left the people wondering what he meant, which in turn produced large-scale discussion
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in both domestic and international media, as well as by Chinese netizens on the internet.
By reviving the memory of the Cultural Revolution, Premier Wen alludes to an area of
Chinese history and a specific context which escapes young Chinese. As such, his
comments caused young people to turn to the Chinese Internet and social media to
discuss the Cultural Revolution. His remarks mirror that of Xinhua, playing upon the
fears of instituting large-scale political reform by suggesting the political chaos caused by
factions at odds during the Cultural Revolution. Each press statement used the violentconnotation of the Cultural Revolution as evidence that the nation must steer the course;
that is to maintain a one-party system controlled solely by the Communist Party. Premier
Wen’s remarks turn the memory of the Cultural Revolution into an all-or-nothing
scenario: should political turmoil occur, all that has been built by the Party will be lost.
Premier Wen’s remarks also act as a deterrent against the Cultural Revolution-era
revivalism of Chongqing party leader Bo Xilai (2007-2012). Bo, a popular Party member
who had been groomed for national leadership, was accused of trying to revitalize a “red
culture movement” in Chongqing in summer 2008. The case against Bo is still evolving
as he awaits trial, and many facts remain unclear as information is hidden by the Party.
The Party accused Bo of urging people to learn and sing “red songs” and created a
movement to bring urban students down to the countryside. In this sense, Bo and the
Chongqing government were targeted as trying to bring the Cultural Revolution back into
the people’s consciousness by playing upon nostalgia of Communist ideology
reminiscent of the Mao years. However these supposed reforms didn’t anticipate that
these folksongs of a bygone era failed to resonate with youth.

72

The Party also accused Chongqing officials under Bo of working to bring urban
students into the countryside for both work and education, a move nearly parallel to
Mao’s Down to the Countryside Movement. 140 During the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent
urban youth to work alongside farmers and workers in rural areas in order to both educate
the youth and remove any bourgeois thinking. These sent-down youth came of age in
these rural and mountainous areas, and their experiences heavily impacted their social
and political outlook, as evidenced through scar literature written primarily by Chinese
who had been sent-down youth. In Chongqing, the local government planned to send
urban youth into the countryside for a month-long community service plan. Supporters
said the plan would bridge a growing gap between village and city, while critics argued it
held unpleasant echoes of the Cultural Revolution. 141 Because of the creation of these
policies, and other Party-deemed egregious offenses, the Party expelled Bo in March
2012.
After Bo was removed from the Party, netizens took to Chinese social media to
express their weariness of what many felt was Cultural Revolution rhetoric. One Weibo
user tweeting under the handle ‘Little Fei Fernando’ wrote that, “the wording is the same
as during the Cultural Revolution, and the techniques are exactly the same,” comparing
the Party rhetoric behind Bo’s downfall with that of the Cultural Revolution. 142 This
similarity was felt among numerous netizens which prompted weariness that leftist
elements were at large amongst Chinese officials. Leftists are defined in China as those
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who are critical of capitalist reforms within China and support Mao-style socialist
policies. Leftist rhetoric in the public’s conscious has been on the rise in recent years due
in thanks to Chinese social media, where old Maoist propaganda posters have been recommissioned with slogans denouncing the Japanese over a heated island dispute.
While many facts remain missing as to the validity and reasoning behind the
above campaigns, this study uses the events of Bo’s fall from power at the hands of the
Party to showcase how the youth have turned to the Internet to specifically draw
comparisons between the events at question and the Cultural Revolution. After the
heavily publicized downfall of Bo, Weibo user Song Xirong’s tweet attracted the
attention of many netizens with her comment: “if we let such a person [Bo] into power,
returning to the era of the Cultural Revolution is not really far off.” 143 Bo’s widely
publicized fall from grace reminded some netizens of the sensationalized trial of the
Gang of Four which signaled the end of the Cultural Revolution. Some web users
commented that Bo’s fall was just another example of court politics, which aims to show
that the “Cultural Revolution could return at any time.” 144 Through these responses, it is
evident that the Party’s efforts to associate the Cultural Revolution with fear and
uncertainty has worked among the younger internet generation.
The heavily publicized and covered tribulations of Bo Xilai’s downfall mixed
with Wen Jiabao’s weariness in overarching political reform for fear of invoking another
Cultural Revolution-style period of chaos portrays the danger and fear which the central
government wants the people to associate with the Cultural Revolution. The Communist
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Party aims to remind citizens of a China in which Mao asked for political participation,
and in return he received a nation-wide riot. A time when divergent political factions
existed and turmoil ensued. In September 2012, after the resurgence of Party rhetoric
following the downfall of Bo Xilai, nationwide anti-Japanese protests plunged China into
a brief period of violence and chaos, which netizens compared to that of the Cultural
Revolution.

4.3 Cultural Revolution Memory and the Internet

The Diaoyu Islands Dispute, which gained momentum in China in September
2012, saw unprecedented anti-Japanese protests and movements in China both online and
offline. The incident began on September 11, 2012 after Japan nationalized the disputed
islands. The Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the action, claiming the long-disputed
islands as part of Chinese territory. What grew in China was open hostility towards the
Japanese and a general boycott of Japanese-made products, which saw organized protests
and disorganized chaotic instances of Japanese-made car smashings between September
15-18. Car smashings occurred through China in most major cities, and nearly all
depictions through Chinese social media and western news sources depicted youth,
particularly college-aged Chinese, at the forefront of the riots. Instances of these car
smashings and protests grew violent and news spread quickly through Chinese social
media where netizens and internet personalities alike took to their microblogging
accounts to denounce the riots. Within many accounts, these commentators made
reference to social memory of the Cultural Revolution.
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Prominent Chinese blogger and social commentator Li Chengpeng took to his
Weibo blog in response to a video that went viral depicting a Chinese man, later
identified as Li Jianli, being beaten with a metal rod within inches of his life for owning a
Japanese car. Even amidst attempts to declare his patriotism and support of China’s claim
to the Diaoyu Islands, the beating continued. Li Jianli narrowly escaped the mob, and
remained partially paralyzed after the incident. Li Chengping, whose blog has over six
million followers, is one of the most distinguished social media users in China. On his
blog Li pronounced his disgust for the beating, noting fear that many youth were calling
the beating “natural” and “just.” He closes his entry by saying, “the Cultural Revolution
was just like this.”145 Born in 1964, Li Chengping grew up in the waning years of the
Cultural Revolution decade; therefore his allusion is not formed from firsthand
experience.
Li’s blog entry produced thousands of comments and shares, in which case many
netizens commented that the act reminded them of “all the innocent victims of the
Cultural Revolution.”146 Others noted similarities between the mob and the political
rallies of “Mao’s time.” 147 And one final netizen, blogger Wang Ran remarked that the
people should let the rule of law ring out, and that taking the law into their own hands is
dangerous. The comment ended that, “it shows precisely that we should clean up the evil
legacy of the Cultural Revolution.” 148
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The Diaoyu Islands Dispute showed Chinese how easily society could revert to
chaotic acts of hatred and violence towards its own citizens. While the anger was directed
at the Japanese, the violence took aim at Chinese citizens, whose Japanese cars, Japanesestyle restaurants, and products were wantonly burned, destroyed, and Chinese citizens
were beaten. During the onset of the dispute, Chinese social media rang out with
numerous references between these actions and that of the Cultural Revolution, and in
particular, comparisons to the actions of Red Guards and the violence dealt. As Li
Chengping wrote, he was shocked by the calls of support for such actions being heralded
on Chinese social media. Beatings and car smashings were being hailed as patriotic and
Chinese youth were taking to the streets to prove their patriotism. As such events
occurred, Chinese social media was alive with a social memory of the Cultural
Revolution which was being revived through the protests and violent acts.
This trend has worked to bring the Mao years back into the public eye as Chinese
youth turn to the internet to discuss Cultural Revolution rhetoric. Old propaganda posters
featuring Mao spread across Sina Weibo’s microblogging platform as netizens took the
posters and superimposed slogans and phrases denouncing the Japanese. Following the
Diaoyu Incident, in early November 2012 Cao Xiaodong, a young AIDS activist, went
missing after posting a photo of himself tearing up a picture of Mao went viral on Sina
Weibo. 149 The act was meant to be a sign of protest to the then-upcoming Eighteenth
National Party Congress. The photo was re-tweeted over nine hundred times prompting
netizen outrage over such an act.
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The memory of Mao and the Cultural Revolution came to a head between China’s
various generations as a result of the anti-Japanese protests of September 2012. These
resurgences carry bitter memories for those who lived through periods of political turmoil
under Mao such as the Cultural Revolution. But not all Chinese share the same
sentiments on Mao’s legacy. On September 9, 2012, the thirty-sixth anniversary of the
death of Mao, a group of older men commemorated the memory of Mao under a bridge
near Zijingshan People’s Square in Zhengzhou, Henan province. From a video that was
shared throughout Sina Weibo, another old man is depicted entering the scene and
accused Mao of committing crimes to China and its people. The group of men proceeded
to physically attack the man until he leaves the scene. 150 The group continues to defend
Mao and denounce the old man. This episode proves to show that the memory of
Chairman Mao remains a contentious issue even among members of the same generation.
This memory is even more complex between members of different generations
within China. On September 18, 2012 during an anti-Japanese rally in Beijing, Maoist
Professor Han Deqiang slapped an eighty-year-old man and called him a traitor to
China.151 Han is the founder of Utopia, a Maoist organization that has gathered a large
following of Chinese youth. At this particular rally, Han was part of a parade of Beijing
students carrying images of Chairman Mao with a banner that read “Chairman Mao,
people really miss you.”152 Global Voices reported that the eighty-year-old man called
out, “To pin all hopes of maintaining this country’s dignity and national interests on Mao
150
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Zedong, this is not just wrong, but unattainable.”153 This prompted Han and others from
his group to accost the old man, who Han alleged continued to insult Mao.
Han took to his personal website to post an entry titled, “Why did I strike this
traitor?” in which he defends his actions, surmising that “if I come across this again in
future rally, I would do the same thing. I broke the law; I would accept its rule. But I
would never apologize.”154 A news post on Sina Weibo described the event and netizens
left over 23,000 comments. While some of the comments balked at Han’s actions against
an elderly man, many netizens reiterated his attack against the old man. 155 One man,
Zhang Hongliang, took to his Sina Weibo account to tweet, “Why can’t we have the
freedom to believe in Chairman Mao? And the right to defend our beliefs? How can we
allow the law to give liberty to those people who insult Chairman Mao?”156 This episode
portrays a deep divide remaining between members of China’s older generations and
those of the post-Cultural Revolution generations. Han Deqiang was born in 1967, at the
onset of the Cultural Revolution. It’s unknown how his childhood affected his political
beliefs, if at all. From images of the events, his followers at the parade appeared to be
men and women mainly under the age of forty, many whom appeared to be of college age,
showcasing that those of the post-Cultural Revolution generations hold a significantly
different memory of the legacy of Mao than those who actually lived through his political
rule.
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This return of the Cultural Revolution rhetoric, both through the punishment
incurred from the tearing of Mao’s picture to the resurgence of Maoists parading about
his images and slogans, portray how the memory of the Cultural Revolution continues on
in China’s post-80’s generation. Netizens turned to social media following such events
and commented on the need to eradicate the “seeds of the Cultural Revolution.” 157 One
Weibo user named Rou’er remarked that this type of political climate proved a “need to
completely eliminate every kind of national remnant of the Cultural Revolution.”158 With
the growing presence of Maoist sympathizers, it is not surprising that netizens sought to
eliminate all remnants of rhetoric of the tumultuous period.

4.4 Reexamining the Cultural Revolution

Through social media, Chinese netizens have granted cyber onlookers a picture of
a disambiguation of the Cultural Revolution lives on in the memory of the internet
generation. Much of this social memory depicted through the internet is due in part to
unofficial socialization, or the bottom-up communication through the internet which
allows younger generations to reshape the memory of the Cultural Revolution through
word of mouth, or in a better sense, word of online web posts. As Zhang argues in
“China’s Social Memory,” “a person’s knowledge of the past is based on numerous
‘stories’ or more exactly, narratives, either imparted by others, or experienced by
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himself.”159 And on Chinese social media, the grand narrative of the Cultural Revolution
imparted by fellow netizens is one which coincides with the Communist Party’s “official
memory” of chaos and fear.
While historical debate and scholarship pertaining to the Cultural Revolution
remains limited on the Chinese Internet, a rare account of crimes committed during this
decade was recently released following the 2012 leadership handover of the Communist
Party. The book, titled Bloody Myth: An Account of the Cultural Revolution Massacre of
1967 in Daoxian, Hunan, was written by Tan Hecheng in 1986. It has since been
published online by the Gongshi Wang website, known in English as Common
Understanding, after being banned for twenty six years. 160 Some of the most graphic
stories of mass killings unleashed during this period remain in cyberspace for netizens to
read, which leading Australian newspaper the Australian says will be “a document of
historical importance for China.”161
Readers may wonder as to how the book remained active in cyberspace and was
not censored by the government. The answer can be found through Chinese academic
Mao Yushi’s blog post following the book’s release on the internet, writing, “It shows
why our young generation must be careful with the future or our society will suffer a
great regression.”162 Amidst the Bo scandal and Premier Wen’s parting warning of a
future Cultural Revolution-like campaign, the Party wants China’s post-80’s generation
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to associate the Cultural Revolution with regression and fear, using it as a tool of
deterrence.
Nearly half a century since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the Party
sought to bring the movement back into the public’s consciousness with the arrest of a
violent radical. In February 2013 Zhejiang province local authorities arrested a Chinese
man in his eighties, identified only as Mr. Qiu for crimes committed in 1967 during the
Cultural Revolution.163 While Chinese law only permits a twenty year statute of
limitations, Qiu was originally called upon the charge in nearly two decades after the
crime occurred. Now, nearly four decades later, Qiu awaits trial for using a rope to kill a
doctor during the height of the Cultural Revolution. Qiu claimed the local civilian
directed him to kill the doctor, surnamed Hong, after the militia targeted Hong targeted as
a spy.
Following this story which spread through Chinese social media, Zhang Ming,
professor of political science at Renmin University, published an editorial in the China
Youth Daily. In his piece, Zhang argued that Chinese society must reflect openly on the
Cultural Revolution if the Chinese hope to regain a sense of humanity and dignity. Zhang
uses cannibalism as a metaphor for the imminent destruction of Chinese society if it fails
to properly reflect; a metaphor reminiscent of the works of Lu Xun. 164 The crux of his
editorial is as follows:
There are many people [in our country] who yearn for a repeat of the
Cultural Revolution, for another violent convulsion. This should send
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shivers through us all. If we refuse to review and reexamine the Cultural
Revolution, we might still be a society of cannibals. And if we are such a
society, it doesn’t matter how bright we might seem on the outside, or how
fully we enjoy the fruits of civilization — we are still a den of
cannibals. 165
Zhang points out that in both the real and the virtual world, there are many, old and
young, who praise and support the Cultural Revolution. As this study argues, these
individuals do not truly understand the horrors of that decade, nor the driving factors
which caused such horrors. Instead, those who praise it see a period of great democracy
in which the masses struggled against those who weakened the Party.
Beijing-based lawyer Liu Xiaoyun spoke out against this sudden resurgence of
supposed Cultural Revolution justice, questioning the government’s motives in revisiting
such a case nearly four decades later. Liu remarked on his microblog that, “the prime
culprits of the Cultural Revolution get away scot free and decades later they chase down
a minor murderer. There were so many homicides during the Cultural Revolution, to
pursue one little old man is a failure of judicial justice and political wisdom.” 166 Others
questioned how an individual could be put on trial for crimes committed during a period
where the legal system was nearly nonexistent.
The case brought out an outflow of support for Qiu’s trial, with netizens drawing
allusions between Qiu’s case and that of Nazi war criminals. 167 Likewise, in his editorial
Zhang Ming comments that the only other event in modern human history was the Nazi
period in Germany. Many differences arise between the two periods, and drawing such a
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similarity is dangerous to all parties involved. The Nazi genocide against non-Aryans
does not remotely stand against the events of the Cultural Revolution. The Nazi period
was highly planned, methodical, and documented. Nazi war crimes were orchestrated in a
top-down manner, with most German citizens left in the dark concerning the atrocities
occurring within their backyard.
The events in China, on the other hand, were often unplanned acts of violence
which came from the bottom-up. While Mao’s policies and Mao Zedong Thought
galvanized much of the violence, it manifested from the people’s interpretation of his
ideology. To set the two periods against each other depicts the grave misinterpretation
which Chinese today hold of the Cultural Revolution, dangerously misinformed about the
motivations and driving factors which spurred individuals like Qiu to commit such
violent acts and thus skewing its place among world history. From his Weibo account,
Henan University student Ma Tongfu argued that, “every Cultural Revolution criminal
should be resolutely pursued and held responsible. Murderers, instigators – not a single
one should be left behind.”168 Ma’s comment depicts the belief which Chinese youth have
bought into that the only way for society to come to terms with the Cultural Revolution is
to ensure that all those who committed crimes during that period are brought to justice; a
near-impossible feat. However, Zhang argues that unlike Germany, China has had no
historical commemoration or reflection of any kind for what occurred during the Cultural
Revolution. This is due to the fact that scholarship and educational curricula on the
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subject remains heavily censored, and in such an environment, one can only wonder if
historical commemoration and reflection can even exist.
Among some social media comments on Weibo was a plea by netizens for China
to allow discussion and reflection on the Cultural Revolution. In light of these netizendeemed resurgences, some netizens feel a need to collectively acknowledge the hardships
of the decade lost to the Cultural Revolution. Understanding and moving past it is the
only way China can move forward. Netizens argue that if Chinese do not completely
clear the history of the Cultural Revolution, there is no way that society can reform.169
Finally, one Weibo user by the name of ‘Vertigo’ supported this sentiment by writing, “if
we don’t thoroughly reflect on the Cultural Revolution, then all the efforts we put into the
development of China will be like dancing with shackles.” 170

4.5 Labeling Chinese Netizens: “Internet Red Guards”

Further perpetuating the distorted social memory of the Cultural Revolution
growing on China’s Internet are western media pundits and researchers who apply
negative labels on Chinese netizens and internet trends, such as referring to netizens as
“Red Guards 2.0.” Instead of seeing netizen activity against corruption as a system of
checks and balances, western audiences are seeing netizens as an unruly online mob.
Aside from haphazardly demonizing the term for those who lived through the turbulent
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years of the Cultural Revolution, placing such a label on netizens undermines the
tremendous growth and democratic efforts being waged on the Chinese Internet.
The internet facilitates conversation that transcends location, economic means,
and educational status. In many ways, the internet acts as a great equalizer. In China, both
urban and rural citizens can log into the internet and discuss their opinions through social
portals. At present there are scores of websites aimed at reading Chinese social media,
showcasing the importance utilizing the internet to gauge social information. On top of
these websites, online news portals such as the Atlantic and BBC World News frequently
insert netizen comments and social media posts into news articles discussing social issues
in China.171 The Chinese Internet contains hundreds of millions of blogs, or websites on
which an individual records opinions, information, and social commentary, mainly
written by the post-80’s generation. While microblogs, such as Twitter, only allocate a
limited number of characters per post, the responses and shares to a prominent post can
grant immense insight into its importance. By analyzing and compiling posts and data
from various Chinese microblogging, blogging, and web forums, these websites act as
news portals granting western audiences a view of the range of discussions and emotions
on the Chinese Internet.172
By making accessible comments and social commentary of Chinese netizens,
these websites grant weight to the issues which Chinese web users hold. While these
websites excel at providing a glimpse of the social commentary present on the Chinese
Internet at a given time, they lack a historical foundation in their reporting. There remains
171
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a large hole which needs to be filled of historical research behind analyzing social
sentiments of the Chinese Internet. Due to the character restrictions of microblogs, where
most of these China-watching websites get their information, the full historical context
can be missing from a Chinese netizen’s post.
Rebecca MacKinnon, co-founder of Global Voices Online, an “international
network of bloggers, translators, and citizen journalists that follow, report, and
summarize what is going on in the blogosphere in every corner of the world,” actively
follows events which transpire on the Chinese Internet.173 After the influx of HFS cases
which arose in 2008, MacKinnon began to question the direction that such social actions
by netizens can lead. Through her blog, “RConversation,” MacKinnon made reference to
similarities between Chinese netizens and Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution. On
February 27, 2009, MacKinnon posted an entry titled “From Red Guards to cybervigilantism to where next?” writing that:
Like the Red Guards, the intent of today’s cyber-vigilantes is idealistic;
they believe in their absolute moral righteousness. Sometimes they expose
corrupt and venal officials who deserve to go to jail. Other times they
conduct moral witch hunts against people whose behavior may not be very
admirable but what crime did they commit exactly and who is to be the
judge?174
MacKinnon further elaborated on her allusion in an article with the New York Times
titled, “China’s Cyberpose.”175 MacKinnon told journalist Tom Downey that the Chinese
government’s contentment with allowing web users to focus on localized corruption
reminds her of the Cultural Revolution, having been quoted as saying, “The idea that you
173
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manage the local bureaucracy by sicking the masses on them is actually not a democratic
tradition but a Maoist tradition.”176 Downey writes in his article that human flesh
searches have been tagged by some as “Red Guards 2.0.” MacKinnon’s allusions set the
stage for western media outlets to scrutinize the actions of Chinese web users while
making comparisons, while not always as straightforward as MacKinnon’s, to the
Cultural Revolution. This began a media trend which aims to place labels on Chinese
netizens ranging from “cyber Red Gaurds,” to “internet vigilantes,” to “cyber mobs.” 177
Utilizing such labels for Chinese netizens in western media instantly places a
negative connotation on their actions. This is especially harmful for use in western media
where stories about China are frequently misrepresented. Placing labels and using
descriptions of netizen actions reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, such as “Internet
Red Guards,” is also harmful to promoting an accurate historical description and social
memory of the Cultural Revolution. Instead, these labels work in favor of promoting the
social memory of violence and chaos which the Communist Party advocates.
Guobin Yang speaks to the issue of placing labels on Chinese netizens in his
article, “Technology and Its Contents: Issues in the Study of the Chinese Internet.”178 In
his article, Yang speaks to the invention of various labels seeking to describe the
discourse on the Chinese Internet. Yang argues that while some cases involve disturbing
methods of privacy invasion, this is simply one part of the story. What remain left out are
the collective protests which happen because “Chinese netizens, frustrated with the lack
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of social justice and outraged by government corruption, decide to redress social ills.” 179
And the most important facet is that while media pundits and government officials are
creating and labeling the Chinese Internet, the voices of those being labeled are missing.
This mirrors how post-80’s youth turn to the internet to compare current events to the
Cultural Revolution, without taking into account the opinions and voices of those who
lived through that decade.
Creating labels to place upon Chinese web users’ internet activities is both
careless and dangerous. In modern China, social media has become an often direct link
between the people and their government. As netizens seek to expose corruption through
the internet, the government heeds their call and brings targeted officials to justice. And
Party leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are turning to social
media, tweeting government news and holding live web chats with the public. Placing
such disproportionate labels onto Chinese netizens is ignorant of Chinese history and
assumes that the social mentality of the Mao era has evolved little in the decades since his
rise to power. By referring to netizens as the “digital masses” and seeking to summon
images of Red Guards storming Tiananmen Square for a chance to see Mao speaks little
to the evolution that Chinese society has went through in the past four decades, not to
mention the tremendous growth between China’s relations with the western world.
Continual usage of these labels will inevitably create a skewed memory of the Cultural
Revolution among western audiences as well as harm outside understanding of the drastic
social changes being attributed to the Chinese Internet.
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It is clear that there has been a recent resurgence of Cultural Revolution memory
being played out on the Chinese Internet, in which cases the Party used the memory of
the Cultural Revolution to their own ends. As the government turned to the media and
internet to associate fear and chaos with any reform that could potentially lead to another
period of multiparty rule, the Cultural Revolution became the backdrop which the chaos
is set against. Similarly, the spontaneous nature of anti-Japanese protests which occurred
in the fall of 2012 saw netizens turning to the internet to make broad similarities between
the violence of the protests and that of the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, China’s
post-80’s generation turned to the web to redefine the personal experiences of those who
lived through the Cultural Revolution against the backdrop of the Party’s constructed
history. What these instances show is that the state’s history of the Cultural Revolution is
prescribed by China’s post-80’s generation. Netizens use the label of the Cultural
Revolution to denounce societal violence yet lack the knowledge to realize that the two
events share few similarities. At the same time, western pundits call out China’s netizens
as modern-day Red Guards. Each instance portrays the misinterpretation of history
surrounding the Cultural Revolution, and the extent to which violence, chaos, and unruly
masses have come to symbolize the decade, both in the eyes of China’s younger
generations, as well as through western onlookers.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

As netizens took to the internet in April 2012 to argue against the millions of lives
lost during the famine resulting from the Great Leap Forward, their comments and
arguments highlighted their proclivity to believing the official Party line. While netizens
dismissed allegations of rural peasants dying from starvation, many wondered why they
didn’t simply find other sources of food to make up for China’s food shortage. One
netizen posed, “I really don’t understand why they didn’t plant vegetables and grains.
They were sent down to the countryside to labor, weren't they?”180 Such remarks are
telling of the profound gaps of historic knowledge among Chinese youth.
Online communities are an influential image into the discussions, commentaries,
and limitations surrounding China’s post-80’s generation. These communities and the
discussions they hold do not exist in a vacuum. Netizens go online to exchange ideas,
share opinions, and interact with one another in ways which closely relate to their offline
interactions. Therefore it is concluded that the online debates into the legacy of the
Cultural Revolution relate back to what youth are taught in schools and the knowledge
they are exposed to.
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The Chinese Communist Party works to keep the history of its periods of political
turmoil and growing pains obscured. The true facets of its history of famine, political
chaos, and social violence remain absent from educational curricula and scholarly
publications. The result of this has been a generation of Chinese who have grown up with
a limited knowledge of policy failures. This generation outwardly believes official
pronouncements and is taught the official narrative of the Party since 1949. As a result,
this generation fails to think critically or fact-check the Party’s history. This in turn
creates a tense political atmosphere on the Chinese Internet where netizens praise the
arrest of an old man for his violent act during the Cultural Revolution, brand another man
a traitor for speaking against the memory of Mao.
Actions such as these create a barrier between the post-80’s generation and that of
their parents, compounded through the works of social commentators such as Han Han.
The generation which came of age during the Cultural Revolution received a
revolutionary education, taught to uphold Maoism and purge traditional elements of
society. Unlike children of the reform era, those of the Mao generation experienced a lack
of continuity in their lives. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, that which had been
purged was reinstated and the experiences of their youth were branded as political
mistakes. To those of China’s post-80’s generation, this period is glossed over and
committed to memory as a period of political turmoil that resulted in violence and chaos.
The experiences and lives of their parents’ generation are absent from the memory. As a
result, a lack of historical respect stands between the two generations, where the voices of
those who suffered in the past are purposefully silenced.
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This generation of netizens is not been taught that mistakes are inevitable in the
forward-motion of a political body. Online checks and balances mirrors the evolution of
citizen monitoring endorsed by China’s various government throughout the nation’s
imperial and Communist histories. While they turn to the Chinese Internet using it as a
system of checks and balances to call out corrupt local-level officials, netizens do so at
the behest of the Party. Netizens argue against a Free Tibet because the government
glorified its history in the region. They smash Japanese-made cars and turn to the internet
to denounce the Japanese the government told them the Japanese encroached on Chinese
territory. From such actions, it’s no surprise that western internet analysts refer to
Chinese netizens as “cyber mobs” and “Red Guards 2.0.”
The invocation of the Cultural Revolution holds different meanings for the
different groups who use it. The Party uses the memory of the Cultural Revolution to
legitimize its rule and argue in favor of why multi-party rule will not work in China. It
reduces the complexity of the Cultural Revolution to allude to the chaos and turmoil of
the decade as an inevitable consequence. This argument is easily bought by Chinese
youth. Netizens use the memory of the Cultural Revolution as a metaphor to interpret
events, such as the anti-Japanese protests and the accusations against Bo Xilai.
It is crucial for the Party to increase scholarly work and publication on issues
relating to the Cultural Revolution within China. Such a move would allow subsequent
generations to view the period with a historical lens rather than a broad political lens
placed upon them by the Party. The government needs to stop bringing its memory back
to attention by simply relating it to violence and chaos. To water down the decade’s
history simply into these themes ignores the voices and experiences of those who lived
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through it. Instead of hoisting the Cultural Revolution up as a period of regression that
must be avoided moving forward, youth should be granted access to its history as a lesson
on the dangers of totalitarian ideology. Such action could bridge the gaps between
generations in China, rather than widen them.
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